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Abstract 
A topic that has received a significant amount of attention within the            
international community is the concept of harmful tax competition. This is           
of particular relevance to the EU due to the additional exposure to this             
problem the Member States experience by virtue of the internal market. A            
closely related concept is that of aggressive tax planning where          
multinational enterprises abuse mismatches between tax systems allowing        
them to pay low or no tax on large parts of their profits. The Commission’s               
recent State aid investigations into the advanced rulings handed out by           
Member States is an attempt to resolve a situation where Member States            
facilitate tax avoidance for tax competition purposes. This paper focus on           
the four investigations where a final decision has been reached: ​Starbucks,           
Fiat, Apple ​and ​Excess Profit​. 
 
The paper introduces the reader to the background of tax competition before            
explaining the current state of the law surrounding the notion of State aid in              
Art. 107. The focus is on the concept of the selective advantage in the area               
of tax law. A review of the ECJ’s case law in this area show a significant                
degree of inconsistency in how the test of selective advantage is to be             
applied. The ECJ puts a major emphasis on the question of competitive            
advantages being granted on a discriminatory basis. This is contrary to the            
traditional idea of State aid which require there to be a transfer of state              
resources to an undertaking. But the ECJ seem to consider evidence of            
unequal treatment under the tax laws as enough to raise a presumption that             
this prerequisite is fulfilled. 
 
Using that logic the Commission argues in the cases mentioned above that a             
failure to abide by the OECD’s arm’s length principle in the area of transfer              
pricing is contrary to Art. 107. As this paper illustrates this further expands             
the scope of Art. 107 to such a degree that the Commission can be regarded               
as harmonizing this area of law through the State aid process. This paper             
argues that this interpretation by the Commission infringes too much on the            
Member States’ tax sovereignty and that a more restrictive approach to the            
State aid test is needed. 
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Sammanfattning 
Ett ämne som väckt stora diskussioner inom internationell skatterätt är          
fenomenet skadlig skattekonkurrens mellan länder. Detta är speciellt        
relevant för EU-samarbetet då den inre marknaden innebär ökade         
möjligheter för länder att delta i sådan konkurrens. Ett närliggande problem           
är så kallat aggressiv skatteplanering som avser när multinationella företag          
utnyttjar skiljaktigheter mellan jurisdiktioner för att tillägna sig        
skattemässiga fördelar. Kommissionen nådde nyligen fyra beslut där        
medlemsstater hade givit ut förhandsbeslut som hade faciliterat sådan         
skatteplanering; ​Starbucks, Fiat, Apple ​och ​Excess Profits​. Detta ansågs av          
Kommissionen vara statligt stöd. Denna uppsats fokuserar på en rättslig          
analys av dessa. 
 
Uppsatsen förklarar innebörden av skattekonkurrens i en kortare        
bakgrundsdel innan den sedan fortsätter med en analys av rättsläget. Fokuset           
ligger på frågan om hur statligt stöd ska definieras under Art. 107. Det visar              
sig att ECJ’s praxis angående denna fråga inte är konsekvent. Domstolen           
använder en mycket vid definition av statligt stöd genom att fokusera på om             
konkurrensfördelar föreligger mellan jämförbara företag som följd av        
skattereglerna. I domstolens ögon är det ofta tillräckligt att bevisa att så är             
fallet för att rekvisiten angående statliga resurser och ekonomisk gynning          
ska vara presumerade uppfyllda. 
 
Kommissionen utnyttjar denna praxis för att argumentera för att         
medlemsstater bryter mot reglerna angående statligt stöd om de inte          
applicerar armlängdsprincipen i enlighet med OECD’s riktlinjer. Denna        
uppsats tar en kritisk syn på detta och visar att kommissionen i själva verket              
harmoniserar skattereglerna i EU på detta område genom dess tillämpning          
av Art. 107. Detta kritiseras i uppsatsen för att gå för långt i inskränkningen              
av medlemsstaternas kompetens inom skatteområdet. Författaren      
argumenterar därefter för en mer restriktiv praxis på detta rättsområde. 
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Abbreviations 
APA Advanced Pricing Agreement/Arrangement 
 
ATAD Anti Tax Avoidance Directive 
 
BEPS Base Erosion and Profit Shifting 
 
BPOT Business Property Occupation Tax 
 
Commission European Commission 
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CUP Comparable Uncontrolled Price method 
 
ECJ European Court of Justice, Court of Justice of the  
European Union 
 
EU European Union 
 
IP Intellectual Property 
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OECD Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
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WTO World Trade Organisation 
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1: Introduction 
1.1 Background 
In recent years the European Commission (the Commission) has opened a           
number of investigations into advanced tax rulings handed down by          
Member States to private companies. The outcome of these cases has been            
subject to significant amounts of speculation and discussion. So far the           
Commission has reached a final decision in four such cases finding that the             
Netherlands, Luxembourg, Belgium and Ireland have provided illegal State         
aid by misapplying the arm’s length principle contained in international          
transfer pricing law. The controversy surrounding these proceedings centers         
on the question of the scope of Art. 107 in the Treaty on the Functioning of                
the European Union (TFEU). Under the treaties the Member States of the            
European Union (EU) have exclusive competence in regards to their internal           
fiscal affairs unless such competence is explicitly assigned to the Union.           
This include sovereignty over their tax systems. These new developments in           
State aid law and in particular the Commission’s use of the arm’s length             
principle has led to concerns over the increasing power claimed by the EU             
authorities in the area of taxation. 
 
This is happening against a backdrop of increasing worries within the 
international community and the general public over tax avoidance by 
transnational corporations. The appetite to take action against the legal 
systems that facilitate such practices has increased dramatically following 
the financial crisis of 2008 and its immediate aftermath. It is not only 
private actors who are implicated by their abuse of tax laws but also the 
countries that intentionally provide opportunities for this avoidance. This is 
a result of a more global economy where states are pitted against each other 
in competition over investment and other economic activity – incentivising 
them to offer increasingly beneficial tax treatment to multinationals. 
Evidence has shown that EU Member States are uniquely exposed to this 
kind of legislative competition by virtue of the internal market.  Thus the 1
EU is under increasing pressure to enact countermeasures against the effects 
of this phenomenon. This is what seem to have triggered the Commission’s 
more aggressive posture in its State aid enforcement in relation to Member 
States’ tax systems. However as will be shown in this paper the Commission 
is treading on treacherous legal ground as it decides to pursue a solution by 
1 ​Claudio Radaelli and Ulrike Kraemer, “Governance Areas in EU Direct Tax Policy, 
(2008) vol 46:2, ​Journal of Common Market Studies​, p. 315; Philipp Genschel, 
Achim Kemmerling, Eric Seils, “Accelerating Downhill: How the EU Shapes 
Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market”, (2011) vol 49:3, ​Journal of 
Common Market Studies​, p. 585; Michela Redoano, “Tax Competition among 
European Countries. Does the EU Matter?”, (2014) vol 34, ​European Journal of 
Political Economy​, p. 353; Hanno Kube, Ekkehart Reimer, Christoph Spengel, 
“Tax Policy: Trends in the Allocation of Powers Between the Union and Its Member 
States”, (2016) vol. 25:5-6, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 247, 251 f 
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way of the State aid rules. 
 
1.2 Purpose and Delimitation 
This paper seek to answer the question of whether the Commission’s           
interpretation of Art. 107 taken in its recent decisions regarding advanced           
rulings is in line with that Article. It will further endeavour to put these              
decisions in their proper context by providing a review of earlier case law in              
the field of State aid law and direct taxation. Additionally the current            
international developments surrounding the fight against harmful tax        
competition will be briefly explained in order for the reader to understand            
the broader context that the EU legal practice is a part of. In the end the                
paper focuses on the topic of the division of competence between the EU             
and its Member States wondering whether the Commission has gone too far            
in its increasingly expansive interpretation of the State aid provisions. 
 
This paper only seek to explore these topics from the perspective of the EU              
State aid law, specifically Art. 107(1) in the field of direct taxation. A             
discussion regarding the general effects of tax competition or an in depth            
analysis of the arm’s length principle as a legal instrument is therefore            
outside of the scope of this paper. Although an overview of transfer pricing             
and other relevant international rules of taxation will be provided the paper            
will not endeavour to engage in an analysis of their application to factual             
circumstances. Rather our interest lie in how they are used by the            
Commission within its reasoning around Art. 107(1). In regards to the State            
aid provisions themselves the paper is limited to the topic of the legal             
definition of material selectivity. Procedural rules and questions regarding         
regional selectivity are left aside as they are not at issue in the discussion              
regarding advanced rulings, the exception being in regards to the          
retroactivity of the decisions. As this latter point is but a part of a broader               
discussion about the Commission’s powers under Art. 108 as enforcer of the            
rules it will only be touched upon tangentially here in order to keep the              
paper focused on the definition of State aid contained in Art. 107.  
 
1.3 Methodology and Materials 
This paper takes the form of a legal analysis of the case law leading up to                
and including the recent Commission decisions in regards to advanced tax           
rulings. As these are relatively recent developments and the state of the law             
is often not clear heavy use is made of contributions by various authors in              
the fields of State aid and tax law in order to facilitate a meaningful              
analysis. This is on top of the case law of the European Court of Justice               
(ECJ) as well as guidelines provided by the Commission and the           
Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) which        
naturally make up the basis of the analysis.  
 
1.4 Content Outline 
On the outset this paper will provide the reader with an overview of the              
concepts of harmful tax competition and aggressive tax planning. This is           
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done by explaining the theoretical underpinnings of these concepts and a           
brief history of the legal discussion surrounding them. This is important in            
order to understand the role Art. 107 plays in the area of tax law and policy.                
Following this the paper introduces the reader to the legal notion of State aid              
followed by a review of relevant case law in the field of taxation. The legal               
analysis of the new decisions relating to tax rulings takes place next            
followed by a concluding analysis. There I will aim to connect these            
decisions back to the two earlier parts in order to put them into the context               
of the overall development of State aid law. I will further seek to provide              
my own opinions on whether the Commission’s approach is within its           
sphere of competence or if these decisions expand the scope of Art. 107 too              
greatly. 
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2: Harmful Tax Competition 
2.1 Introduction to Tax Competition 
Tax competition between countries has long been considered a major 
problem in the modern era of increasing transnational trade. To put it 
succinctly tax competition concerns practices by which countries 
implements tax legislation with the purpose of luring businesses to its 
territory or alternatively boost the competitiveness of domestic industries in 
the global marketplace. This stems naturally from states competing among 
themselves for investments and other economic activity within an 
increasingly globalized and mobile economy. The reasons for engaging in 
such competition is that it allows a country to increase its tax base and 
generates wealth within the state – allowing it to increase government 
revenue and achieve a higher standard of living for its citizens.   2
 
The economic argument against this form of intergovernmental competition         
is that it results in governments engaging in a so called “race to the bottom”.               
Smaller states which are generally less appealing to foreign investors are           
encouraged to offer lower tax rates in order to lure away economic activity             
from larger economies, who in turn need to follow suit in order to defend its               
tax base and living standards. The assumption is that this leads to less total              
welfare in the system as the ability of governments to provide essential            
public goods and services is compromised by lower tax revenue. Other           3
concerns are more political in nature such as the necessity to shift tax             
burdens toward less mobile sources of tax revenue and the increased           
difficulty of enacting social policies. Finally there is the question of           
fairness; more specifically in regards to the allocation of tax bases between            
countries and the distribution of tax burdens within them.  4
 
As the wording ​harmful ​tax competition would suggest there is also tax            
competition which is regarded as benign or even beneficial. As with the free             
competition between goods and service providers in a free market          
competition between states can result in efficiency gains, for instance by           
incentivising the reduction of government waste, regulatory hurdles (“red         
2 See for example: Andrew P. Moriss and Lotta Moberg, “Cartelizing Taxes: 
Understanding the OECD’s Campaign against “Harmful Tax Competition”, (2012), 
Vol. 4:1, ​Columbia Journal of Tax Law​, p. 1, 6. The authors further identifies 
corruption as a possible incentive for states, although this topic will not be dealt 
with here as it is not a primary concern for the topics discussed in this paper. 
3 Andrew P. Moriss and Lotta Moberg, “Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the 
OECD’s Campaign against “Harmful Tax Competition”, (2012), Vol. 4:1, ​Columbia 
Journal of Tax Law​, p. 1, 7 ff. and​ David Elkins,”The Merits of Tax Competition in a 
Globalized Economy”, (2016) Vol. 91:3, ​Indiana Law Journal​, p. 905, 907 f. 
4 As explained by the OECD in its report; OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An 
Emerging Global Issue​, OECD Publishing (1998), p. 14 f; For a critical discussion 
on these topics see; ​David Elkins,”The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized 
Economy”, (2016) Vol. 91:3, ​Indiana Law Journal​, p. 905, pp. 938-953 
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tape”) as well as making tax regimes less susceptible to fraud. Thus tax             5
competition has been put forward as enhancing allocative efficiency of          
resources globally. Indeed whether the overall effect of tax competition is           6
beneficial or damaging is a subject of some dispute. The debate regarding            7
the virtues and harms of tax competition is outside the scope of this paper;              
however in order to examine the efforts taken to fight it we need to define               
what kinds of tax competition is actually considered harmful. 
 
2.2 What Kind of Tax Competition is Harmful? 
In 1997 the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN)          
released a resolution where it adopted the Code of Conduct for business            
taxation which were explicitly targeting harmful tax competition. The Code          8
states that when assessing whether a measure is harmful the following           
should be considered: 
 
1. “​whether advantages are accorded only to non-residents or in respect of           
transactions carried out with non-residents, or 
2. whether advantages are ring fenced from the domestic market, so they do not             
affect the national tax base, or 
3. whether advantages are granted even without any real economic activity and           
substantial economic presence within the Member State offering such advantages,          
or 
4. whether the rules for profit determination in respect of activities within a            
multinational group of companies departs from internationally accepted principles,         
notably the rules agreed upon within the OECD, or 
5. whether the tax measures lack transparency, including where legal provisions are           
replaced at administrative level in a non-transparent way.​”  9
 
A few months later in 1998 the OECD released its own report on the              
subject. It identifies two kinds of harmful tax regimes; tax havens and            10
harmful preferential tax rules. For preferential regimes –the most relevant          11
for this paper– four points of assessment for whether the regime is harmful             
is put forward; (a) low or zero effective tax rate on the relevant income, (b)               
“ring-fencing” in order to protect the domestic economy from the effects of            
preferential rules, (c) a lack of transparency regarding how the regime           
5 Andrew P. Moriss and Lotta Moberg, “Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the 
OECD’s Campaign against “Harmful Tax Competition”, (2012), Vol. 4:1, ​Columbia 
Journal of Tax Law​, p. 1, 9 f 
6 Most notably in;​ ​OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue​, 
OECD Publishing (1998), p. 8 ff 
7 For example see generally; ​David Elkins,”The Merits of Tax Competition in a 
Globalized Economy”, (2016) Vol. 91:3, ​Indiana Law Journal​, p. 905 
8 ​Conclusions of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of 1 
December 1997 Concerning Taxation Policy, 98/c 2/01 
9 ​Conclusions of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of 1 
December 1997 Concerning Taxation Policy, 98/c 2/01, annex 1, para B 
10 OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue​, OECD Publishing 
(1998) 
11 OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue​, OECD Publishing 
(1998) p. 19 
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operates and (d) a lack of effective exchange of information with other            
countries.   12
 
The OECD goes on to explain each of these factors. The first one is fairly               
self-explanatory although it is important to note that it is a question of the              
“effective” rate of taxation and as such also captures instances where a state             
apply laws which for example artificially defines a small tax base or apply             
overly generous deductions. Ring-fencing is a more complex topic but          
ultimately targets regimes that arbitrarily insulate the domestic tax base          
from the effects of the rules, the examples given by the OECD is when the               
benefits are restricted to non-residents or when beneficiaries are blocked          
from the domestic markets. The transparency requirement specifically refers         
to when the rules and practices of the regimes are not publicly available so              
to allow for people to rely on them in court or other countries to enact               
countermeasures. In particular the report points to arbitrary administrative         
practices and tax rulings as a way for legitimate regimes to become harmful             
in case these are held secret by the authorities. The OECD goes on to point               13
to a variety of other factors –often related to the four so far mentioned– to               
be considered in an assessment. Most notable of these are that tax regimes             
may be harmful if transfer pricing rules are incorrectly or not at all applied,              
the regime encourages purely tax driven operations or the taxpayer have           
access to a wide network of tax treaties with insufficient safeguards against            
abuse.  14
 
As we can see the conclusions of the Council and the OECD is very similar.               
The focus when identifying harmful tax measures beyond the beneficiaries          
attaining a zero or low rate of taxation is whether the domestic economy is              
shielded from the measures’ effect and a general lack of transparency. 
 
2.3 Countering Harmful Tax Competition 
The EU Code of Conduct is a political agreement and thus strictly an             
instrument of “soft” law. The Member States agreed to not adopt new            
measures that would be considered harmful and to amend or repeal those            
that were already in existence at the time. To achieve this an independent             15
group (the “Code of Conduct Group”) was established to review member           
states’ legislation and submit its findings to the ECOFIN Council, which           
would then have to decide on further action. The only such action explicitly             
mentioned is that the findings may be published and otherwise simply calls            
12 OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue​, OECD Publishing 
(1998) p. 25 ff 
13 OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue​, OECD Publishing 
(1998) p. 26 ff 
14 OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue​, OECD 
Publishing(1998) p. 30 ff 
15 ​Conclusions of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of 1 
December 1997 Concerning Taxation Policy, 98/c 2/01, annex 1, para C and D 
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on member states to cooperate in combating this issue. The one exception            16
is a call on the Commission to review whether some Member State tax             
measures may be considered State aid but without granting the Commission           
any new powers in this regard. However the Commission at the time            
released a Notice coinciding with the Code of Conduct which laid out a new              
approach in regards to business taxation in the area of State aid law.  17
 
In a report to the ECOFIN Council delivered in 1999 the Code of Conduct              
Group identified 66 measures across all Member States and their dependents           
which contained harmful features. The Commission launched State aid         18
investigations into 15 of those measures including 4 which had been           
previously accepted by the Commission as not constituting illegal State aid.          
Today the Code of Conduct Group primarily focuses on monitoring the            19
rollbacks of those 66 measures and evaluating proposed legislation to          
prevent new market distortions.  20
 
In similar circumstances the OECD sought to reduce the worst effects of tax             
competition by encouraging states to adopt less harmful rules through the           
Global Forum on Taxation . The eventual primary focus of this work were            21
on improving the transparency and effectiveness of information exchange of          
tax regimes, for instance by attacking far-going bank secrecy rules. The           
Forum were regarded as successful in this regard as shown in the OECD             
progress report of 2006. The scope and ambition of this project increased            22
after 2008 however due to the financial crisis which started that year. 
 
2.4 BEPS and Aggressive Tax Planning 
The financial crisis had a global effect with several countries facing new            
and significant budgetary problems. This led to a renewed appetite to           
challenge jurisdictions applying harmful tax regimes. Notably there was         
intensified focus on the phenomenon of “aggressive tax planning”. This          
refers to when MultiNational Enterprises (MNE:s) by legal means achieve          
16 ​Conclusions of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of 1 
December 1997 Concerning Taxation Policy, 98/c 2/01, annex 1, para H and K 
17 Commission Notice (98/C 384/03) on the Application of the State Aid Rules to 
Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation (1998) 
18 Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) Report to the ECOFIN Council on 
29 November 1999, SN 4901/99 
19 European Commission press Release of 11 July 2001: "Commission launches 
large scale state aid investigation into business taxation schemes": 
http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-982_en.htm  
20 See at the Official Website of the European Commission: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/harmful-tax-competitio
n_en#code_conduct​ and Wattel, Peter; Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free 
Movement, Policy Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters (2013) vol: 
5:1, ​World Tax Journal​, p. 128, 135 
21 A council of representatives from members and some non-members of the 
OECD. 
22 OECD, ​The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress 
in Member Countries​, OECD Publishing, p. 2 ff 
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low or even zero taxation on their profits. The latter is referred to as              
“stateless” or “white” income and as the name suggest denotes income           
which is not taxable in any jurisdiction. This subject is strongly related to             
the concept of tax competition as a state’s decision to accommodate tax            
planning of this nature has essentially the same effect as other forms of tax              
competition.  23
 
This can be accomplished in a wide variety of ways. First of all an MNE               
may abuse the transfer pricing system. This will be detailed more in section             
five but as a general overview the transfer pricing rules are used to allocate              
profits of an MNE between nations by requiring intragroup transactions to           
be made at arm’s length. That means that the remunerations in a transaction             
needs to correspond roughly to what would have been the case if the same              
action had been carried out between two independent undertakings subject          
to normal market conditions. To expedite assessments under these rules          
many jurisdictions allow for Advanced Pricing Agreements (APA:s) which         
are agreements between tax authorities and MNE:s that determines how the           
MNE’s tax base should be established under these rules. An MNE could            
then secure in the knowledge what its tax liability in one country will be              
plan its business accordingly. One way this could be abused would for            
instance be if said MNE then attained a second APA from another country             
which applies a different method to calculate the tax base which may cause             
a situation of double non-taxation to arise.  24
 
The example in the previous paragraph is what is called a mismatch, in that              
case between two different APA:s. Another common way to avoid taxation           
for MNE:s is to abuse mismatches implemented directly within different tax           
systems. For example if two jurisdictions classify an entity or a financial            
instrument differently. Mismatches may also occur by the way of tax           
treaties. For instance where the country of residence exempt income from           
what it considers a Permanent Establishment (PE) and the source state does            
not define a PE the same way and as a result does not tax that income.                25
23 ​For a full review of the interrelationship of these two concepts see: Paolo 
Piantavigna, “Tax Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning in the BEPS Era: How EU 
Law and the OECD are Establishing a Unifying Conceptual Framework in 
International Tax Law, Despite Linguistic Discrepancies”, (2017) vol 9:1, ​World Tax 
Journal​, p. 47 
24 Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccianico, Fiscal State Aids, Tax Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (2015) vol. 24:2, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 63, 69; citing the European 
Commission Staff Working Paper, ​The Internal Market : Factual Examples of 
Double Non-Taxation​, Consultation Document (2012), in particular p. 8 f; See 
further Werner Haslehner, “Double Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing and State Aid”, 
in editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, Edoardo Traversa, ​State Aid Law and 
Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016) p. 145 
25 European Commission Staff Working Paper, ​The Internal Market : Factual 
Examples of Double Non-Taxation​, Consultation Document (2012), p. 6 ff, I would 
in general recommend this document for many more examples of different kinds of 
mismatches 
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Aggressive tax planning primarily regards the exploitation of such         
mismatches for the purpose of lowering an MNE’s overall tax burden. 
 
Aggressive tax planning has been addressed by the OECD under the           
heading of “Base Erosion and Profit Shifting” (BEPS) and was the subject            
of a major report by the organization in 2013. Base erosion refers to the              26
reduction in a country’s tax base to which profit shifting –enterprises           
moving their profits outside of that jurisdiction– is considered to be the            
main contributor. Later that same year the OECD Members adopted the           
highly influential ​Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting where           
they outlined a number of goals to be achieved in order to curtail the              
perceived causes of this problem. The plan broadly speaking addresses          27
three topics; the allocation of taxation rights, procedural reform as well as            
the tackling of the abuse of tax treaties and other international tax rules. It              
calls on the OECD to develop new rules in these areas for the OECD              
Members to apply in an effort to curb the problems presented by BEPS, a              
process that is currently ongoing . 28
 
The Commission has also answered the call to combat BEPS and is            
currently pursuing an ambitious project of corporate tax reform building on           
its own action plan. The plan called for a relaunch of the Common             29
Consolidated Corporate Tax Base (CCCTB) which would require MNE:s to          
calculate one taxable base for the entirety of their EU activities to later be              
apportioned to Member States in accordance with a set formula . This was            30
based on a prior proposal from the Commission which were ultimately           
rejected by the Member States, however an important difference in the new            
proposal is that it requires the CCCTB system to be mandatory in order to              
effectively counter the effects of aggressive tax planning. Further the plan           
calls for measures improving allocation of taxation rights (i.e profits ought           
to be taxed where they are generated), effectiveness, transparency and          
EU-level coordination of tax regimes.  
 
So far the Commission has proposed two “packages” of measures in the            
pursuit of this agenda, the Tax Transparency Package and the Anti Tax            
Avoidance Package. As part of the latter the EU has adopted the Anti Tax              
Avoidance Directive (ATAD) which include rules limiting interest        31
deductions, codifying exit taxation rules, addressing hybrid mismatches as         
26 OECD, ​Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting​, OECD Publishing (2013) 
27 OECD, ​Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting​, OECD Publishing (2013) 
28 See the OECD’s Official Website for more information at 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/ 
29 COM(2015) 302, ​Communication from the Commission to the European 
Parliament and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the 
European Union: 5 Key Areas for Action​ (2015) 
30 This global apportionment technique is an often considered alternative to current 
transfer pricing practices which has been rejected so far by the OECD in favour of 
the arm’s length principle. 
31 Council Directive 2016/1164 (2016) 
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well as a controlled foreign company rule and a general anti-abuse rule. The             
ATAD is intended to enter into force on 1 January 2019.  
 
2.5 The Role of the State Aid Rules: Negative         
Integration 
In his opinion in the ​GIL case Advocate General Geelhoed considered the            32
State aid provisions in the treaty as ​lex ​specialis within the area of             
distortions of competition. In instances where such distortions arise from the           
grant of aid those rules are the governing law. He distinguishes these rules             
from what is now Art. 116 and 117 of the TFEU. Those provisions lay              33
down a special procedure by which the Commission –in case it finds that a              
rule will cause distortions and thus threaten the internal market– can           
recommend to a Member State to amend a proposed law. If the Member             
State refrain from doing so the EU legislature by way of the ordinary             
legislative procedure is then empowered to issue the necessary directives to           
force compliance. These Articles has never been used in regards to tax law             
which should not come as a surprise considering the Member States’           
reluctance to infringe on their own sovereignty to tax. 
 
However in light of this the State aid rules can be a valuable tool for the                
Commission to fight harmful tax legislation. Primarily since it is the only            
option available to it besides the free movement provisions that is binding            
law. In cases where the Commission can find differential treatment under           
tax laws which is tantamount to a transfer by the state to an undertaking the               
State aid rules can thus be used against that measure.  
 
One of the primary issues with applying the State aid rules in the area of tax                
law is the fact that Member States supposedly enjoy fiscal autonomy under            
the EU treaties. The EU is thus not competent to infringe on the tax              
sovereignty of Member States without authorisation. This was confirmed by          
the ECJ in the ​Schumacker ruling. This freedom on the part of the Member              34
States is not limitless however. As the ECJ has noted on multiple occasions             
this does not allow Member States to infringe on prohibitions laid down in             
the treaties. This relationship between EU and national law is referred to as             
negative integration. As EU primary law grow more defined through the           
case law handed down by the ECJ the discretion enjoyed by the Member             
States in their areas of exclusive competence narrows. This ability of the            
ECJ to enforce conformity of domestic legal systems is ​de facto ​only limited             
by the scope of the provisions of EU primary law in the treaties. As we               35
will see in the next section the State aid rules has been increasingly used in               
32 C-308/01, ​GIL Insurance and Others v. the Commissioners of Customs and 
Excise​ (2004) ECR I-04777 
33 Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in case C-308/01, para 65-67 
34 C-279/93, ​Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker​ (1995) ECR I-00225 
35 See for example: Hanno Kube, Ekkehart Reimer, Christoph Spengel,  “Tax 
Policy: Trends in the Allocation of Powers Between the Union and Its Member 
States”, (2016) vol. 25:5-6, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 247, 254 
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tax cases in recent years. At the cost of Member State autonomy this has              
resulted in an increasing rate of this kind of integration side-by-side with the             
active steps described previously in this section. 
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3: The Notion of State Aid 
3.1 Article 107 
The EU rules on State aid are founded upon and governed by Articles 107              
and 108 in the TFEU. State aid control has been a part of the EU legal body                 
since the inception of the internal market originating in the Treaty of Rome.             
It is a legal doctrine unique to EU law. The intent behind the law is to                
remove distortions of free competition in the internal market by avoiding           
scenarios where Member States subsidizes domestic industries. Hence        
turning into a race between Member States requiring them to expend           
significant amount of resources on subsidies in order to protect their           
domestic market. Further it may limit cross-border movement, as the          
Member States may end up limiting their subsidies to certain “national           
champions”. For example some industries may be subsidized in Germany          
while another type of industry enjoys subsidies in France, removing the           
incentive of firms to utilize their freedom of movement.   36
 
State aid is defined in Art. 107(1) of the TFEU, which states that: 
 
“[...] ​any aid granted by a Member State or through State resources in any form               
whatsoever which distorts or threatens to distort competition by favouring certain           
undertakings or the production of certain goods shall, in so far as it affects trade between                
Member States, be incompatible with the internal market.​” 
 
Thus in order for there to be State aid as defined in this provision the               
requisites are (1) that there exist an undertaking, (2) that there is a measure              
imputable to the state financed by state resources (3) which grants a            
selective advantage (4) that distorts competition and thereby affects trade          
between Member States. The State aid rules are an autonomous EU legal            
concept and are based on objective factors thus the Commission have no            
discretion in their interpretation. The Commission can however declare aid          
measures as compatible with the internal market, giving the Commission a           
degree of control over the enforcement of these rules.  37
 
3.2 Undertaking 
The requirement of there being an undertaking ought to not be in dispute for              
most of the issues discussed in this paper. According to the most current             
guidelines released by the Commission the definition of undertaking is          38
36 Phedon Nicolaides, “Fiscal State Aid in the EU: The Limits of Tax Authority” 
(2004) vol 27:3, ​World Competition​, p. 365, 369, Conor Quigley, ​European State 
Aid Law and Policy​ (3rd ed. Hart Publishing, Oxford 2015) p. 255 ff 
37 Conor Quigley, ​European State Aid Law and Policy​ (3rd ed. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2015) p. 3 
38 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016), see 
p. 3 f 
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independent of national legal definitions and how the undertaking is          
financed. An undertaking does not have to generate profits nor have that as             39
its purpose. The only requirement for being considered as an undertaking           40
is that an entity engages in economic activity, defined as “any activity            
consisting of offering goods or services on a market”.   41
 
3.3 Imputability 
Contrary to what the text of Art. 107(1) may suggest the ECJ has             
established that the advantage granted has to be both a measure adopted by             
the state ​and ​make use of state resources. As far as imputability of the              
measure itself goes in instances of tax law this is uncontroversial as only the              
state can levy tax in the first place. It is enough for the measure to be caught                 
by the law if it stems from any act of the state, a definition that includes                
local authorities as well as any other public sector entity. This can be a              42
problematic issue when the purported giver of the aid is itself a public             
undertaking, but ultimately the question is whether the resources used can           
be considered to be under the control of the public authorities.  43
 
The second question is then what constitute state resources; another subject           
given a very wide-reaching scope in Commission and ECJ case law. The            
ECJ has held in ​PreussenElektra that there need to be a transfer directly or              44
indirectly of public funds with the result that measures need to burden the             
budget of the state in some way in order to be considered aid within Art.               
107(1). In that case a requirement to buy green electricity at minimum            
prices set by the state and ultimately paid for by conventional energy            
producers (i.e competitors) were not held to be State aid despite its            
distortive effects on competition as state funds were not involved. 
 
According to the Commission the term “state resources” include –beyond a           
direct transfer of funds– commitments to transfer or keep resources          
available in the future, waiving or abstaining from income that should have            
39 Defined in C-41/90, ​Höfner and Elser v. Macroton ​(1991) ECR I-1979, para 21 
40 C-222/04, ​Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v. Cassa di Risparmio di 
Firenze and Others​ (2006) ECR I-00289 , para 122-123, see also C-49/07, 
MOTOE v. Elliniko Dimosio​ (2008) ECR I-04863, para 27-28 
41 C-35/96, ​Italy v. Commission​ (1998) ECR I-3851, para 36; Joined Cases 
C-180-184/98, ​Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensionsfonds Medische 
Specialisten​ (2000) ECR I-6451, para 75; C-205/03 P, ​FENIN v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-6295, para 25 
42 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016), 9 f; 
T-358/94, ​Air France v Commission​ (1996) ECR II-02109, para 62-68; C-248/84, 
Germany v. Commission​ (1987) para 17 
43 T-358/94, ​Air France v Commission​ (1996) ECR II-02109, para 67; C-83/98, 
France v. Ladbroke Racing and Commission​ (2000) ECR I-03271, para 50; 
C-482/99, ​France v. Commission​ (2002) ECR I-04397, para 38 and 50-57; Kelyn 
Bacon, ​European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, 
Oxford 2013) p. 64  
44 C-379/98 ​PreussenElektra v. Schleswag ​(2001) ECR I-02099 
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fallen to the state under usual circumstances as well as the state taking on              
the financial risk of private actors. Within the area of taxation it is the              45
question of potentially foregoing the collection of state income that is most            
relevant. 
 
3.4 Selective Advantage 
The advantage in this context refer to an economic one, that is an advantage              
where a market actor get a discernible benefit improving its economic           
and/or financial position as a result of a measure. In order to ascertain             46
whether there is an advantage at hand one first need to define a point of               
reference representing normal market conditions, the hypothetical situation        
that would exist in the absence of the tried measure. If the undertaking’s             
position is worse in that scenario there is an advantage. Note that the             
comparison is not between the beneficiary’s situation prior and after the aid            
has been received so it does not matter if the beneficiary has seen an actual               
improvement in its circumstances. Other ways of assessing advantage is          47
the so-called private investor test; a capital infusion by a member state is not              
illegal State aid if a private actor would have made the investment on the              
same terms. There is also the Market Economy Operator Principle (MEOP),           
a version of the arm’s length principle which require a Member State acting             
as a supplier or buyer to charge/pay market rates.  48
 
The advantage also needs to be selective as in benefitting certain           
undertakings, economic sectors or the production of certain goods. There          
are three different forms of selectivity; geographical selectivity along with          
de jure and ​de facto material selectivity. This paper will only go into depth              49
in regards to material selectivity in tax matters. 
 
The points of relevance in order to find material selectivity is to find other              
actors in a sufficiently similar legal and factual situation towards which by            
comparison certain undertakings is treated advantageously. In case of ​de          
jure selectivity this can be shown by some undertakings being explicitly           
excluded from the application of a beneficiary measure, for instance by           
singling out a certain sector in the text of the law. A ​de facto selective               
measure accomplishes this implicitly by for instance requiring certain         
45 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016) p. 12 
46 C-39/94, ​SFEI and Others v. La Poste and Others​ (1996) ECR I-03547 para 
58-61; C-342/96, ​Spain v. Commission​ (1999) ECR I-02459 para 41; Kelyn Bacon, 
European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2013) p. 31 
47 See C-143/99, ​Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer 
Zement-werke​ (2001) ECR I-8365, para 40; Kelyn Bacon, ​European Community 
Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013) p. 33 
48 Among others described in: Kelyn Bacon, ​European Community Law of State Aid 
(2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 2013) p. 34 ff 
49 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016) 
sections 5-5.2.3 
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financial thresholds to be achieved in order to apply; limiting the measure’s            
scope to businesses of a certain size. If a public authority have a level of               
discretion in regards to when an undertaking will be entitled to a benefit not              
rooted in clear and objective criteria this will also render a measure            
selective.  50
 
3.5 Distortion of Competition and Trade 
These final prerequisites are usually considered together but one ought to be            
mindful of the fact that they are still mutually distinct and separate. There is              
no need to prove that a measure has had an actual effect on either of these                
points, merely that it has the potential to have one. For now it is sufficient to                
say that an undertaking which sees its economic position overall improved           
means that a measure will have distortive effects on competition. If the            
particular market is open to potential competition from those residing in           
other Member States or the beneficiary itself carries out cross-border          
activities trade will be considered to be affected.  51
 
3.6 State Aid and Taxation: The Three-Step Selectivity        
test 
Over time the influence of the EU over member states’ domestic law in             
general has been steadily increasing and the area of taxation are no            
exception to this development. That State aid could take the form of tax             52
measures has long been accepted in EU law. Tax breaks in the form of for               53
instance a lower calculated tax base, reduced rates of taxation or deferments            
on tax debts is tantamount to a Member State foregoing revenue and            
transferring that income to the tax liable person. The primary issue when it             54
50 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016) p. 27 f 
51 Kelyn Bacon, ​European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2013) p. 82 
52 ​For general reviews of this see: Hanno Kube, Ekkehart Reimer, Christoph 
Spengel,  “Tax Policy: Trends in the Allocation of Powers Between the Union and 
Its Member States”, (2016) vol. 25:5-6, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 247; and Raymond Luja, 
“Do State Aid Rules Still Allow European Union Member States to Claim Fiscal 
Sovereignty?”, (2016) vol 25:5-6, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 312 
53 See C-70/72, ​Commission v. Germany ​(1973); C-173/73, ​Italy v. Commission 
(1974); Phedon Nicolaides, “Fiscal Aid in the EC; A Critical Review of Current 
Practice”, (2001), Vol. 24:3, ​World Competition​, p. 319, 324; Michael Lang, “State 
Aid and Taxation: Recent Trends in the Care Law of the ECJ”, (2012), Issue 2, 
European State Aid Law Quarterly​, p. 411; Pierpaolo Rossi-Maccanico, “The 
Gibraltar Judgment and the Point on Selectivity in Fiscal Aids”, (2009) Vol. 18:2, 
EC Tax Review​, p. 67, 68 
54 As enunciated by the ECJ in C-169/08, ​Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. 
Regione Sardegna ​ECR I-10821, para 56-58; see also Conor Quigley, European 
State Aid Law and Policy (3rd ed. Hart Publishing, Oxford 2015) p. 99 and in 
particular for an explanation of how the latter correspond to the private creditor test 
see Wolfgang Schön, “Tax Legislation and the Notion of Fiscal Aid: A Review of 5 
Years of European Jurisprudence”, in editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, 
Edoardo Traversa, ​State Aid Law and Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg 2016) p. 4 f 
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comes to identifying this type of aid is the question of selectivity owing to              
the fact that tax measures is often constructed and worded in a general way.  
 
For the purpose of establishing material selectivity generally a three stage           
approach has been developed; (1) a reference system (also referred to as the             
“benchmark”) needs to be identified, (2) there has to be a determination            
whether the measure is ​prima facie selective in light of that system and (3)              
whether there is a justification. 
 
The original selectivity test in the area of taxation were explicated by            
Advocate General Darmon in the ​Sloman Neptun ​case where he put forth            55
that a tax measure is selective when it constitutes a derogation from the             
scheme of the general system. ​The latter refers to the reference system            56
which is the general rules the undertaking would normally be governed by.            
By comparing the contested measure to that system it can be determined            
whether the measure represents a derogation from it, in which case there is             
State aid if it involves beneficial treatment. It is thus necessary to establish             
that the undertaking is relieved of a financial burden that it usually has to              
carry in its budget and that this corresponds to a loss of government             
revenue. This point of assessment present difficulty when certain         57
undertakings ​de facto benefits from systems ostensibly written and applied          
in a general manner.  58
 
In 2016 the Commission released a notice on the notion of State aid where it               
offers a very general overview of how the reference system may be            
identified:  
 
“​The reference system is composed of a consistent set of rules that generally apply              
— on the basis of objective criteria — to all undertakings falling within its scope as defined                 
by its objective. Typically, those rules define not only the scope of the system, but also the                 
conditions under which the system applies, the rights and obligations of undertakings            
subject to it and the technicalities of the functioning of the system.​”  59
 
In the following paragraph to the one quoted above the Commission           
differentiates between two kinds of systems. Generally applicable rules such          
as corporate income taxes and special levies singling out certain activities           
55 Joined cases C-72/91 and C.73/91, ​Firma Sloman Neptun v. Seebetriesrat Bodo 
Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffarts ​(1993) ECR I-00887 
56 Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-72/91. para 50 
57 See C-143/99, ​Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer 
Zement-werke​ (2001) ECR I-8365, para 38-39, Joined cases C-78-80/08, ​Ministero 
dell’Economica e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate v. Paint Graphos​ (2011) 
ECR I-07611, para 45-46 
58 Kelyn Bacon, ​European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2013) p. 73, and Phedon Nicolaides, “Fiscal Aid in the EC; A Critical 
Review of Current Practice”, (2001), Vol. 24:3, ​World Competition​, p. 319, 331 
59 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016), para 
133 
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for taxation such as excise duties on products detrimental to public health.            60
In the latter case the special tax itself is the system of reference. The notice               
also include examples on when a reference system cannot be identified.           
Thus if a coherent system of reference cannot be found to exist or that              
reference system is found to be designed in a way that is “arbitrary or              
biased” this does not preclude the finding of an advantage. This last point             61
as we will see is extremely relevant to current developments in State aid             
jurisprudence. 
 
After this comes the question of ​prima facie selectivity. Under this part it             
needs to be shown that a sector or undertaking is indeed benefitting from the              
measure. A measure may be selective directly or indirectly but some basis            62
of selectivity needs to be shown; as in a specific sector being favoured (tax              
rebates for energy producers for example ) or companies which shares          63
specific features (such as in the case of tax rebates for women employees             
favouring sectors where women make up the predominant share of the           
workforce ). 64
 
In order for a system to be justified under the last point it must be               
established that the contested measure derives from the inherent guiding          
principles of or is necessary for the functioning of the system (expressed as             
“the nature or general scheme of the system”). This definition does not            65
include external policy objectives such as for instance national security          
needs or environmental policy. The primary example given of a justified           
measure in the notice is progressive tax rates or measures to counter tax             
fraud. The interplay between Member State autonomy in the area of           66
taxation and state aid law makes itself felt here. At least in theory the              
Member State is free to decide on the internal goals of its tax system as they                
are entitled to set their own economic policy, at least in the absence of EU               
harmonization measures. In other words how its policy goals are to be            
achieved and what principles are to guide the application of the tax system             
is up to the Member States. The need for a measure to be proportionate to              67
60 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016), para 
134 
61 Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016) para 
129 
62 See Kelyn Bacon, ​European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford 
University Press, Oxford 2013) p. 73 ff for examples 
63 See C-143/99, ​Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer 
Zement-werke​ (2001) ECR I-8365 
64 See C-173/73, ​Italy v. Commission​ (1974) 
65 ​Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016) p. 31 
66 Kelyn Bacon, ​European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2013) p. 80 
67 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v. Gibraltar and UK 
(2011) ECR I-11113 para 97; Commission Notice (98/C 384/03) on the Application 
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the objective is present as well.   68
 
To connect back to the overarching logic of State aid law; the reason the test               
need to start by finding a general system is to determine what the “normal”              
situation is. In other words the result that would prevail in the absence of the               
tested measure. Only by doing this can we determine that there is an             
advantage, i.e that the undertaking is relieved of a financial burden it would             
normally have to bear. Through assessing whether the measure is a           
derogation from that system –as opposed to a general system itself– it can             
be determined that the measure is selective. This can be demonstrated by the             
fact that comparable undertakings to the beneficiaries does not have access           
to the preferential treatment. The justification criterion is more elusive. But           
preliminarily it can be stated that if the measure is in line with the logic of                
the reference system it would not be a derogation –rather it could be viewed              
as an extension– of that system. As I will demonstrate in the next part the               
ECJ has been nebulous as to the correct application of this test. In particular              
where it comes to deciding on what the reference system should be in a              
given case. But also in regards to how to reconcile the open-ended            
effect-based assessment of State aid law with this relatively technical test. 
 
of the State Aid Rules to Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation (1998) 
para 23-27; Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as 
Referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (2016) para. 156 and Marie-Ann Kronthaler and Yinon Tzubery, “The State 
Aid Provisions of the TFEU in Tax Matters”, in editor: Michael Lang, Pasquale 
Pistone, Josef Staringer, Claus  Schuch, ​Introduction to European Tax Law: Direct 
Taxation​ (4th ed. Linde Verlag, Wien 2016) p. 113 
68 Joined cases C-78-80/08, ​Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze and Agenzia 
delle Entrate v. Paint Graphos​ (2011) ECR I-07611 para 75; Kelyn Bacon, 
European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University Press, Oxford 
2013) p. 80 
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4: Taxation and State Aid in      
Case Law 
4.1 Paint Graphos 
The ECJ best outlined the test of selectivity in the ​Paint Graphos case.             69
That case concerned a request for an advanced ruling forwarded by an            
Italian court regarding Italian exemptions from corporation tax which were          
reserved for cooperative societies. The ECJ’s explanation given to the          
referring court deserves to be quoted in full: 
 
“​In order to classify a domestic tax measure as ‘selective’, it is necessary to begin               
by identifying and examining the common or ‘normal’ regime applicable in the Member             
State concerned. It is in relation to this common or ‘normal’ tax regime that it is necessary,                 
secondly, to assess and determine whether any advantage granted by the tax measure at              
issue may be selective by demonstrating that the measure derogates from that common             
regime inasmuch as it differentiates between economic operators who, in light of the             
objective assigned to the tax system of the Member State concerned, are in a comparable               
factual and legal situation.​”  70
 
As the cooperative societies in ​Paint Graphos were liable and subsequently           
excepted from the general corporation tax the ECJ established that as the            
system of reference. The ECJ then states that exempting certain legal           
persons depending on their legal form from that tax constitute a derogation            
from that system. Interestingly the actual analysis carried out after that           
statement regards the unique characteristics of cooperative societies. The         
primary points being that they are non-profits, that they exist for the benefit             
of its members as opposed to outside investors and tend to have smaller             
profit margins than other economic actors. There is no mention of the            
internal characteristics of the Italian tax system in this part. The main point             71
of the judgement seem to be to specify that cooperatives which do not fulfill              
the above mentioned criteria and operate similar to other (profit-making)          
undertakings is to be excluded from the beneficial regime. Those that do            
fulfill the criteria are held to not be in a comparable factual and legal              
situation to other undertakings.  
 
As discussed by Michael Lang the decisive impact of the comparability test            
is noteworthy. It would seem that under the reference system chosen there            72
69 Joined Cases C-78-80/08, ​Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze and Agenzia 
delle Entrate v. Paint Graphos​ (2010) ECR I-07611 
70 Joined Cases C-78-80/08,​ Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze and Agenzia 
delle Entrate v. Paint Graphos (2010) ECR I-07611 ​para 49, the court refers to the 
2006 case of C-88/03 ​Portugal v. Commission​ ECR I-07115, a leading case on the 
area of regional selectivity 
71 Joined Cases C-78-80/08,​ Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze and Agenzia 
delle Entrate v. Paint Graphos (2010) ​ECR I-07611, para 50-62 
72 Michael Lang, State Aid and Taxation: Recent Trends in the Case Law of the 
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actually is no distinction between a cooperative society and other          
undertakings as the general corporate tax seeks to tax all businesses equally.            
Thus it would seem appropriate to instead consider whether a separate           
derogating system applying to cooperatives is justified. However the court          
evidently only consider the justifiability criterion relevant if the measure is           
considered selective under the comparability test.  
 
4.2 Adria-Wien and British Aggregates: Special Levies 
Different tax treatment of various activities is not uncommon in tax           
legislations but the ECJ has nonetheless persisted in limiting the          
possibilities of member states doing so. This was demonstrated in the           
Adria-Wien ​and ​British Aggregates ​cases, where the court were asked          73 74
about treating manufacturers differently from service providers and whether         
there is such a thing as a “negative” derogation from a general scheme             
respectively. 
 
Adria-Wien regarded a request for an advanced ruling concerning a          
consumption tax on electricity in Austria which included rebates for          
consumers engaged in the manufacture of goods. The central question          
regarded whether the rebate was selective as it excluded certain identifiable           
undertakings, notably providers of services. The ECJ stated that the amount           
of undertakings enjoying an advantage did not matter when assessing a           
measure’s selective versus general nature. Nor does it matter in the context            
of finding a justification within the general scheme if the selectivity is the             
result of objective criteria or not. Further the ECJ maintained that since the             
basis for the measure were to encourage the efficient use of energy there             
were no justification for giving preferential treatment to certain consumers          
since the energy used regardless of purpose were equally damaging to the            
environment. The scheme therefore were capable of constituting State aid.  75
 
British Aggregates ​were about a scheme in the UK which imposed punitive            
taxes on the exploitation of certain materials used in construction known as            
aggregates. The contested measure implemented environmental policy and        
aimed at increasing effective use of resources by encouraging the use of            
recycled material and aggregates produced as a byproduct of other processes           
rather than virgin aggregates (which are directly extracted from quarries).          
The UK therefore intended to exempt the former from the tax as well as raw               
virgin aggregates intended for export. The UK further exempted aggregates          
intended for certain specified manufacturing processes. The Commission        
found no issue with the proposed scheme claiming that the exemptions were            
compatible with the internal objectives of the tax measure. This decision by            
ECJ (2012) Issue 2, ​European State Aid Law Quarterly​; p. 411, 418 ff 
73 Case C-143/99, ​Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer 
Zementwerke​ (2001) ECR I-08365 
74 C-487/06, ​British Aggregates v. Commission ​(2008) ECR I-10515 
75 C-143/99, ​Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zementwerke 
(2001) ECR I-08365 para 48-53 
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the Commission was appealed. 
 
The appealing party argued that the narrow construance of the tax resulted            
in aid being granted to activities which had a similar environmental impact            
to the mining of aggregates but was not covered by the measure. The reason              
the tax had been constructed in such a way was to guard certain industries              
against international competition it was argued. The Commission’s and the          
UK’s rebuttal to this was that the levy was a “negative” form of State aid, i.e                
it was selective in singling out industries to be disadvantaged as opposed to             
being given an advantage. Since Member States are free to set its own             
environmental goals they have a sole right to decide which industries to            
subject to these kinds of charges.  76
 
The ECJ rejected the reasoning of the Commission. Relying on the           
argument that the assessment of State aid concerns the effect of a measure             
as opposed to its goals the ECJ rather simply concluded that the narrow             
delineation of the scheme –which excluded from its application activities          
with similar effect to those to which were subject to the levy– was capable              
of having the effect of granting the exempted undertakings an advantage.           
Hence the focus of the assessment under Art. 107 is not on what regulatory              
technique is used (a narrowly applied rule versus an exemption from a more             
broadly construed tax) but purely on the actual outcome of a measure.  77
 
These cases demonstrates the ECJ’s approach to regulatory taxes focused on           
achieving a specific objective through the taxation of certain activities.          
Unlike the approach taken in ​Paint Graphos the comparability analysis is           
strictly focused within the confines of the goal of the tax measure. If a              
special levy or exemption does not apply to a situation where we would             
expect it to based on the objective it constitutes a derogation that            
subsequently require justification.  
 
4.3 Sardinian Stopover Tax: Parallel with the       
Fundamental Freedoms 
This case concerned a tax levied by the Italian Autonomous Region of            78
Sardinia on stopovers by aircraft. The tax only applied to aircraft not            
resident in the region as it was conceptualized as an environmental tax on             
tourism. The tax was ultimately held to infringe both the prohibition on            
State aid and the freedom to provide services. Our interest in this case is in               79
how the ECJ ultimately decide to apply the selectivity test to establish the             
former. In a quite remarkable statement Advocate General Kokott claimed          
that the test of State aid should be the same as for the fundamental freedoms               
76 C-487/06, ​British Aggregates v. Commission ​(2008) ECR I-10515​ ​para 63-75 
77 C-487/06, ​British Aggregates v. Commission ​(2008) ECR I-10515​ ​para 86-88 
78 C-169/08, ​Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna ​ECR 
I-10821 
79 C-169/08, ​Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna ​ECR 
I-10821, see the conclusions of the ECJ 
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in order to avoid a discrepancy between the two assessments. She goes on to              
make an analysis very similar to the one carried out in the ​British             
Aggregates case, stating that both resident and non-resident aircraft         
operators pollute the environment equally necessitating that the tax be          
applied to both without regard to determining a specific reference system.           80
Another noticeable part of her opinion relates to the fact that she argues that              
simply by fulfilling the selectivity criterion the use of state resources and the             
existence of an advantage can be presumed. She argues –without any closer            
analysis– that by imposing the tax only on non-residents the resident           
undertakings has been granted an indirect advantage and had Sardinia taxed           
them as well the Region's revenue would have been increased.   81
 
The ECJ seem to endorse these views in its judgement. In regards to the use               
of state resources the court reiterates that a tax that should be levied on all               
undertakings but is limited to a specific group is tantamount to a transfer of              
resources to those businesses which escapes the tax’ application. In          
determining the selectivity of the measure the court goes so far to refer to its               
reasoning relating to the freedom to provide services and clearly says that a             
measure which only apply to a limited set of comparable economic actors is             
selective. It thus seem that in cases such as this the explicit identification             82
of a reference system is unnecessary and selectivity as well as the use of              
state resources can be inferred from the mere fact that comparable           
undertakings are not taxed equally.   83
 
4.4 The P Case: Discretion of Tax Authorities 
The ECJ had the chance to address this topic further in its advance ruling in               
P . That case regarded a Finnish rule which limited the carry forward of             84
losses in the case of a takeover. This could be set aside by the Finnish tax                
authority and it enjoyed significant discretion in this regard. In other words            
this was an exception to an exception. The question the referring court asked             
were then how to determine the reference system, was it the general tax             
system which allowed for a carry forward of losses or the exception to that              
rule in the case of a change of ownership. In this instance the ECJ found               85
that the case concerned existing aid and as such did not need to grapple with               
this question. However it did note that where the tax authority enjoys            
80 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in case C-169/08, para 134-139 
81 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in case C-169/08, para 126-127 and 
144-145 
82 C-169/08, ​Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna ​ECR 
I-10821, para 55-63 and 35-36 
83 for another analysis of this case which reaches similar conclusions see: Michael 
Lang, “Tax Legislation and the Notion of Fiscal Aid: A Review of 5 Years of 
European Jurisprudence, in editor:  in editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, 
Edoardo Traversa, ​State Aid Law and Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg 2016) p. 28 ff; Compare to: T-500/12, ​Ryanair v. Commission ​(2015) 
para 90 and T-473/12, ​Aer Lingus v Commission ​(2015) para 76 
84 C-6/12, ​P Oy ​(2013)  
85 C-6/12 ​P Oy ​(2013)​ ​para 13 
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discretion and bases its decisions on conditions not stemming from the           
internal objectives of the tax system that is considered a selective advantage.            
Thus the ECJ heavily imply that the fact that the tax authority in a circular               
gave the maintainment of employment as a reason to grant a request to be              
excepted from the rule entails State aid on its own merit.  86
 
4.5 Gibraltar: An Inherently Discriminatory System? 
One of the most important developments in this field took place in the             
Gibraltar case . That ​case concerned a proposed new corporate tax system           87
to be implemented in the Autonomous Region of Gibraltar. The system           
consisted of a payroll tax, Business Property Occupation Tax (BPOT) and a            
registration fee. The payroll tax required the payment of a set amount per             
employee the taxpayer had in Gibraltar, the BPOT were charged on the            
property occupied by the taxpayer and the registration fee were an annual            
fee for companies registered in Gibraltar with companies that did not intend            
to generate income being charged half the amount of a company that did.             
The first two rates were limited to 15% of the corporation’s profit with no              
tax at all levelled on a business not making a profit. There were special rules               
applied to specific kinds of companies, a separate tax on profits from            
financial services that were also limited by the 15% cap while utility            
companies were taxed on 35% of profits with the payroll tax and BPOT             
being deductible. 
 
The Commission considered the scheme to be geographically and materially          
selective. In the Commission’s view the material selectivity stemmed from          
the facts that companies not making a profit escapes tax, that companies            
making a low profit relative to their number of workers and extent of             
occupied property benefits from the cap, and that offshore companies          
having neither workers nor property in Gibraltar completely escapes         
taxation. Thus these three groups of businesses would gain a selective           
advantage.   88
 
Gibraltar and the UK disputed these findings arguing that the proposed           
measures constituted a general tax system in its own right and that the             
Commission failed to identify a reference system from which the proposals           
could derogate. It follows from this line of argumentation that none of the             
supposedly materially selective rules exempted undertakings from any tax         
that would have normally been levied. Gibraltar further argued that the           
constituent parts were justified by the internal logic of the system as            
Gibraltar taxed two factors of production in short supply in the region and             
that the cap were an expression of the ability-to-pay principle. Secondly the            
argument were forwarded that the Commission failed to identify the          
86 C-6/12 ​P Oy ​(2013)​ ​para 26-31 
87 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2011) ECR I-11113 
88 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2011) ECR I-11113 para 21 
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beneficiaries since profits are naturally variable and thus it cannot be said            
that the groups the Commission argued were targeted to benefit from the            
scheme were sufficiently specific.  89
 
The Commission argued that the scheme were a “hybrid” system and that            
the rules in question were exceptions from each other. Apparently this           
hybrid nature rendered the proposal as a whole indiscernible as a general            
system and the Commission argued that the internal logic of the system            
itself were flawed. This was based on the argument that the logic of a              
payroll tax and BPOT required that a company paid more tax the more             
workers or property it had, in other words the cap were a derogation from              
that system (as opposed to Gibraltar’s argument that the cap formed a part             
of the general system along with the taxes). Due to this the scheme did not               
qualify as a general tax system and was inherently selective. As for the third              
point regarding offshore companies the Commission identified the        
unusually large amount of these in Gibraltar as a clearly discernable group            
of undertakings that was favored by a regime consisting of payroll and            
property taxes, making these parts of Gibraltar’s proposal inherently         
selective as well.  90
 
The Court of First Instance ruled in favor of Gibraltar and the UK. In              91
essence that court held that the Commission had failed to correctly apply the             
selectivity test by failing to identify a reference system and failing to prove             
that the constituent parts (the kinds of taxes chosen and the cap) could not              
flow from the internal logic of the tax system. The Judgement of the Court              
of First Instance was highly critical of the Commission’s argument that the            
two goals pursued by these measures were incompatible, observing that it           
was based on hypotheticals and that the Commission imposed its own logic            
in the place of a valid reference system. In so doing the Commission             
overstepped the boundaries of its competence. 
 
The Advocate General overall seem to agree with the assessment of the            
Court of First Instance and offers a thorough overview of the derogation            92
procedure along with the justifications for it. It is in this part that the              93
Advocate General criticizes the Commission as in his view they conflate the            
concepts of selectivity and advantage. This as without defining a point of            
reference to determine whether a derogation was at hand it was not possible             
to identify a charge that would normally have been borne in the budget of              
89 Joined cases T-211/04 and T-215/04, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2008) ECR II-03745 para 118-140 for the full 
argumentation 
90 Joined cases T-211/04 and T-215/04, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2008) ECR II-03745 para 129-138 
91 Joined cases T-211/04 and T-215/04, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2008) ECR II-03745 
92 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in joined cases C-106-107/09, para 147 
93 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in joined cases C-106-107/09, para 
155-156 
30 
 
Åke Häggqvist 
Lund University 
Spring 2017 
the offshore companies, resulting in the measure being compared to a           
hypothetical regime conjured by the Commission. Without a point of          94
reference the Commission cannot demonstrate that Gibraltar loses tax         
revenue as there is no rule which would apply in the absence of the              
contested measure that would result in tax being levied. The Advocate           95
General goes on to scrutinize the Commission’s argument that the system is            
inherently selective and finds it wanting. Once again the Commission’s          
failure to apply the three-step test in this case makes it impossible for             
Gibraltar to justify the measures as being in accordance with the internal            
logic of its tax system. This results in the Commission acting outside its             
competence by removing Gibraltar’s ability to decide on its own the           
objectives of its tax system.  96
 
The ECJ affirmed that a measure applying indistinctly to all companies is            
not to be considered State aid. The ECJ went on to confirm the Court of               97
First Instance’s reasoning in regard to the Payroll tax and BPOT vis à vis              
the cap. It did however overturn the ruling in regards to offshore            98
companies. Citing the ​British Aggregates ​case law the ECJ argued that the            99
payroll tax and BPOT were the correct reference system and that due to the              
fact that offshore companies by their very nature would not be liable to pay              
such taxes they were singled out as a group for an advantage. This was              
based on the logic that State aid is defined by its effect, meaning that              
regardless that no other tax rule would have required offshore companies to            
pay any tax –i.e there were no derogation from any rule– the effect was still               
that offshore companies were favored. To argue otherwise in the eyes of the             
ECJ were to interpret the selectivity test too strictly with the result that the              
State aid prohibition could be circumvented by the employment of a           
particular regulatory technique, rendering Art. 107 ineffective. Later in         100
the judgement –in a segment regarding the non-binding nature of the           
Commission’s notices– the court goes further and proclaim that the          
identification of a reference system is not required at all to establish an             
advantage.  101
94 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in joined cases C-106-107/09, para 202 
95 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in joined cases C-106-107/09, para 
162-166 
96 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in joined cases C-106-107/09, para 
217-221 
97 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2011) ECR I-11113 para 73 
98 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2011) ECR I-11113 para 83-84 
99 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2011) ECR I-11113 para 87; Citing Case 
C-487/06, ​British Aggregates v. Commission ​(2008) ECR I-10515​ ​para 85-89 and 
C-279/08 P, ​Netherlands v. Commission ​(2011) ECR I-07671 para 51 
100 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2011) ECR I-11113 para 92-95 
101 Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2011) ECR I-11113 para 131-132 
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The ​Gibraltar ​judgement has been widely discussed and criticized. Already          
in the opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen he warned that to follow            
along with the Commission’s argument of inherent discrimination would be          
to endorse a “methodological revolution” in the area of State aid. Similar            102
concern was voiced by John Temple Lang who noted that had the case             
involved the prospect of recovery it would have been impossible to establish            
how much the benefiting companies were to pay. Even further it would not             
be possible to identify which companies were to do so unless the ECJ             
intended to suggest with the judgement that all companies established in           
Gibraltar is in a comparable position. This leads to the point that the court              
never carried out a proper comparability test. It is unclear how offshore            
companies as a group can be in a similar position to every other company.              
Lang argues that a correct reading of the decision is that this is only true for                
some companies and subsequently criticizes the ECJ for not specifying in           
what instances this is the case.   103
 
This leads to the larger point made in the literature that the concepts of              
advantage and selectivity is not kept distinct by the ECJ in its case law.              
Determining a measure as selective will usually be enough in the eyes of the              
court to also presume that an advantage is at hand. This gives the             104
impression that the actual test conducted is a discrimination test similar to            
what the ECJ apply in other areas of law rather than the one described in the                
Commission’s notice on State aid. Under such a system it would not be             
necessary to identify a “normal” state of affairs where an undertaking would            
be required to pay a tax that it has subsequently under a preferential regime              
been exempted from. Instead establishing that there is a difference of           
treatment resulting in a distortion of competition between comparable         
companies would be enough. When one adds the broad comparability test           
used in ​Gibraltar where seemingly every company may be considered          
comparable in certain instances this significantly expands the scope of          
measures that could be infringing on the State aid prohibition.  
 
Michael Lang endorses this interpretation of the case law. He argues that            
this follows naturally from the effect based view taken by the law. It would              
be problematic he argues –in line with the Commission and ECJ in            
Gibraltar– if mere regulatory techniques could render a discriminatory         
regime immune from the reach of State aid law. Instead the relevant factor             
is if companies treated differently are in a competitive relationship, at which            
point the unequal treatment is liable to result in a distortion of competition.            
Although he is more skeptical of this development, John Temple Lang            105
102 Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in joined cases C-106-107/09, para 202 
103 John Temple Lang, “The Gibraltar State Aid and Taxation Judgment- A 
Methodological Revolution?” (2012) issue 4; ​European State Aid Law Quarterly​ p. 
805, p. 807 ff 
104 Michael Lang, State Aid and Taxation: Recent Trends in the Case Law of the 
ECJ (2012) Issue 2, ​European State Aid Law Quarterly​; p. 411, 418 ff 
105 Michael Lang, State Aid and Taxation: Recent Trends in the Case Law of the 
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comes to a similar conclusion. Peter Wattel on the other hand regards the             106
Gibraltar ​case as a potentially more restricted derogation from previous          
case law. Mirroring the Commission’s opinion he argues that Gibraltar had           
specifically constructed the legislation so that it excluded offshore         
companies in order to escape the scope of the State aid prohibition and that              
this technicality cannot exclude a finding of State aid. He further notes            107
that this would be in line with the case law of the World Trade Organisation               
(WTO) where the fact that no actual failure to collect a tax otherwise due              
has taken place does not by itself preclude the finding of a subsidy. Citing              
the case ​US-FSC he notes that the WTO appellate body determined there            
was a need to –in the absence of a normative benchmark– to compare             
“legitimately comparable income”. In general there seem to be agreement          108
in the literature with the notion that ​Gibraltar were trying to circumvent the             
State aid rules and that this justify the finding of State aid even if the test                
applied is not in line with the three-step test. There is however a lack of               
clarity as to what degree this doctrine can be used in other cases. 
 
4.6 Banco Santander and Autogrill España: Specificity       
of the Selectivity Criterion 
The ECJ were confronted with a somewhat similar case recently in           
Santander which concerned Spanish deductions of goodwill as        109
amortization when an undertaking taxable in Spain acquired shares in a           
foreign company. The Commission held this to be illegal State aid as there             
was in its view no reason to restrict that practice from being applied to              
similar domestic acquisitions. Reminiscent to the ​Gibraltar ​case above the          
general court took a narrower view of the case law. From that court’s             
interpretation of ​Gibraltar ​and ​Adria Wien ​among others the Commission          
were under an obligation to identify a specific category of businesses that            
were exclusively benefitting from the regime or at least a specific one that             
were excluded. The Commission had purely relied on the fact that the            110
Spanish measure was derogation from the normal regime favoring a certain           
form of transaction. In conclusion the General Court ruled that as the            111
ECJ (2012) Issue 2, ​European State Aid Law Quarterly​; p. 411, 418 ff 
106 John Temple Lang, “The Gibraltar State Aid and Taxation Judgment- A 
Methodological Revolution?” (2012) issue 4; ​European State Aid Law Quarterly​ p. 
805, 812 
107 Peter Wattel, Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free Movement, Policy 
Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters (2013) vol: 5:1, ​World Tax 
Journal​, p. 128, 133 
108 Peter Wattel, Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free Movement, Policy 
Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters (2013) vol: 5:1, ​World Tax 
Journal​, p. 128, 139, citing WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) 108 Appellate Body 
Report circulated on January14 2002, para 89-91 
109 Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, ​Commission v. Banco Santander, 
Santusa Holding and World Duty Free Group​ (2016)  
110 T-219/10 ​Autogrill España v. Commission ​(2014) para 44-45 and 67; T-399/11, 
Banco Santander and Santusa Holding v. Commission​ (2014) para 48-49 
111 T-219/10 ​Autogrill España v. Commission ​(2014) para 50 and 63; T-399/11, 
Banco Santander and Santusa Holding v. Commission​ (2014) para 54 
33 
 
Åke Häggqvist 
Lund University 
Spring 2017 
measure in question were open to all undertakings as long as they engaged             
in the kind of transaction described in the law and no group of specifiable              
undertakings were excluded or had exclusive access to the benefits of the            
law it should be regarded as a general measure as opposed to a selective              
one.  112
 
The ECJ recently overturned this decision and in doing so clarified its case             
law established in ​Gibraltar​. In its view it was sufficient in order to prove              
selectivity to show that the law derogated from the general scheme –in this             
case the taxation of goodwill under the general Spanish corporate tax           
system– and that this conferred an advantage on some market actors but not             
others in spite of them being in a comparable position in light of the              
ordinary tax system. Since the Spanish tax system applying to domestic           
undertakings regarded in essence the same situation as those benefitting          
from the exception the latter were a derogation.   113
 
In ​Gibraltar ​the identification of a specific group of undertakings were           
necessary in order to show that the offshore companies were ​de facto            
beneficiaries of a selective advantage by virtue of an otherwise generally           
applicable system. But in case of a law that derogates from another a             
specific subset of undertakings does not have to be identified as           
beneficiaries. The ​Santander case has now been sent back to the General            114
Court in order for a comparability test to be carried out. If the domestic              
undertakings are held to be in a comparable legal and factual situation to             
their foreign counterparts the rule will then constitute a selective advantage           
unless it is justified under the third point of assessment. The outcome of             115
this will be important for the next section of this paper as it will answer the                
question whether cross-border transactions are comparable under Art. 107 to          
purely domestic ones. The ECJ touches on this question when considering           
the second ground of appeal and appear to be of the opinion that aid purely               
benefitting cross-border actors may indeed be considered selective.  116
 
4.7 Discussion: Emphasizing Comparability 
The reason the three-step test requires the identification of a reference           
system and a subsequent derogation is that this allows for a relatively            
straightforward finding of an economic advantage. If we recall the original           
quote in ​Sloman Neptun there has to be a charge for the beneficiary to be               
112 T-219/10 ​Autogrill España v. Commission ​(2014) para 70-71; T-399/11, ​Banco 
Santander and Santusa Holding v. Commission​ (2014) para 74-75 
113 Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, ​Commission v. Banco Santander, 
Santusa Holding and World Duty Free Group​ (2016) para 64-90 
114 Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, ​Commission v. Banco Santander, 
Santusa Holding and World Duty Free Group​ (2016) para 72-86 
115 Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, ​Commission v. Banco Santander, 
Santusa Holding and World Duty Free Group​ (2016) para 72-86 
para 93-94 
116 Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, ​Banco Santander and Autogrill España 
(2016) para 72-86 
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alleviated from as otherwise an economic advantage cannot be shown to           
exist. The source of consternation with the ECJ’s case law is that this             
concept appears to be supplanted by the more general concept of a            
competitive advantage. Rather than showing a financial charge avoided by          
an undertaking we would then be satisfied with simply showing that the            
alleged beneficiary is in a better situation than its competitors. In that latter             
context the ​Gibraltar ​case makes perfect sense as the offshore companies           
were undoubtedly granted an advantage in them paying less in taxes giving            
them a competitive edge over other undertakings. By adopting this logic the            
use of a benchmark beyond other comparable undertakings for establishing          
both selectivity and an advantage is unnecessary. This idea is corroborated           
by Advocate General Kokott in the ​Finanzamt Linz ​case where she argues            117
that in cases of unequal tax treatment no transfer of state resources needs to              
take place for a finding of State aid. Thus the only relevant question to              118
answer it would seem is whether comparable undertakings are treated          
differently due to a tax measure. 
 
This holds true for the other cases as well. As noted in the literature when it                
is not clear which of two tax measure ought to be regarded as the general tax                
system versus the derogation it would be closest at hand to observe that             
there are two potential systems to be applied; one beneficial and one less so.              
The less beneficial system would then take the place of the reference            
system. This is in line with ​British Aggregates as in that case it was              119
technically the special tax that was the derogation from the general system.            
In the ​Sardinia Stopover Tax ​case no reference system were identified at all             
and it was enough that the special tax did not apply to certain undertakings              
it should have in light of its objective.  
 
This approach thus also avoids the issue of determining what the term            
“general” implies and instead allow for the simple identification of          
differential treatment to establish a selective advantage. In ​Santander ​the          
onus of the court’s decision is consequently on the fact that two equivalent             
transactions (in the eyes of the ECJ) are treated unequally rather than the             
question of what renders a measure general. The court appears to establish a             
rule that similar situations should be taxed equally. Even if the General            120
Court were to rule that the companies fulfilling the criteria for the beneficial             
regime to apply are not in a comparable position to those that do not this               
still means that the comparability test is the decisive factor. 
 
This would seem to go against the wording of the law. Indeed the ECJ has               
117 C-66/14, ​Finanzamt Linz v. Bundesfinanzgericht​ (2015) 
118 Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in case C-66/14, para 74 
119 Marie-Ann Kronthaler and Yinon Tzubery, “The State Aid Provisions of the 
TFEU in Tax Matters”, in editor: Michael Lang, Pasquale Pistone, Josef Staringer, 
Claus  Schuch, ​Introduction to European Tax Law: Direct Taxation​ (4th ed. Linde 
Verlag, Wien 2016) p. 112 
120 ​Compare: Case C-75/97, ​Belgium v. Commission​ (1999) ECR I-03671, Opinion 
of Advocate General La Pergola, para 8 
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said as much in the British ​Black Cabs ​case. In that case only licensed              121
(“black”) cabs were allowed to use bus lanes while other vehicles (including            
those belonging to other types of private transportation services) were fined           
for using them. The ECJ did not consider this to constitute State aid as it did                
not fulfill the criteria of the measure being financed through state resources.           
However cases such as this is distinguishable from tax cases in that the              122
latter by their very nature will always involve state resources and a            
consequent competitive advantage. The conclusion one reaches is that in          
any instance where a rule of tax law constitutes unequal treatment between            
two similar situations it is liable to infringe on the State aid prohibition.  
 
As observed by Wattel this is very much akin to the mentality adopted in the               
area of the freedom of movement rules. In such cases the ECJ first carries              123
out a discrimination test; is a cross-border situation treated unfavorably          
relative to a comparable domestic situation. If discrimination is found to be            
present this is then followed by a review if any of the derogations laid down               
in the treaty is applicable to the measure at issue, after which the court              
carries out a proportionality test. Transposed to the matter of a tax measure             
being tried under State aid law the test would look as follows: Are two              
undertakings in a comparable legal and factual situation being treated          
differently (i.e required to pay different amounts of tax)? Is this justified? If             
justified is the measure proportional to that goal?  
 
I have not talked about the final point of assessment under the three-step test              
much as of yet; whether a measure is justified or not. But if we accept this                
new understanding of the test this question of justifiability swells in           
importance as it would dramatically increase the scope of art. 107 from what             
is implied in section 3 and 4. Wattel argues this point as well.  124
 
5.9 Justifiability 
There is no finding of a selective advantage where it stems from the internal              
logic of the system. This area of State aid law is poorly developed in the               
ECJ’s jurisprudence and it is remarkably unclear what is actually to be            
assessed under this point. This part of the test were explored in ​Tiercé             
Ladbroke ; a case involving differential taxation of bets placed on          125
domestic vis à vis foreign horse races. The ECJ noted that since there were              
different regulatory systems and economic conditions in place for the two           
121 C-518/13, ​Eventech v. The Parking Adjudicator​ (2015)  
122 C-518/13, ​Eventech v. The Parking Adjudicator​ (2015) para 34-47 
123 Peter Wattel, Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free Movement, Policy 
Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters (2013) vol: 5:1, ​World Tax 
Journal​, p. 128, see in particular p. 134 
124 Peter Wattel, Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free Movement, Policy 
Competition and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters (2013) vol: 5:1, ​World Tax 
Journal​, p. 128, p. 134 
125 C-353/95 P ​Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission ​(1997) ECR I-07007; referred to in 
C-53/00 ​Ferring v. ACOSS​ (2001) ECR I-09067; see also Conor Quigley, 
European State Aid Law and Policy (3rd ed. Hart Publishing, Oxford 2015) p. 119 
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kinds of races it would be illogical to superimpose the tax system in one              
instance to the other. This makes no sense as what the court is really saying               
and what ended up being the deciding factor in the case is that the two               
situations are not comparable. This early case fails to distinguish between           
the comparability test and that of justification. 
 
More recently the ECJ pointed to the justifiability criterion in ​P​, although            
this only served to point out that the ground of justification must stem             
directly from the goals of the tax system and not extrinsic policy goals. It              126
is obvious that neither the courts nor the Commission have a firm grasp at              
what a justification under this rule would look like or how it differs from the               
comparability test. As previously mentioned the Commission gives as two          
of its examples progressive taxes and rules combatting fraud. This is           
nonsense since by definition in a system based on the ability-to-pay           
principle two persons falling into different tax brackets are not in a            
comparable position from the point of view of that system in the first place.              
Similarly it is unclear why a rule combatting tax fraud would ever result in              
different amounts of tax being levied on two comparable undertakings and           
not at the very least be considered disproportional. 
 
It has been suggested in literature that the objective of a tax measure is              
simply to raise revenue. But in that case the reasoning in ​Paint Graphos is              127
clearly wrong as it does not make any sense at all why cooperative societies              
and other undertakings would be regarded as incomparable within a general           
tax system seeking to raise revenue by taxing all businesses. The court in             
that case should have held that the cooperative societies were indeed granted            
a selective advantage but that this was justified by the unique position            
granted to this kind of undertaking in Italian law (this is enshrined in the              
Italian constitution no less ). As it stands the court arbitrarily distinguishes           128
between different undertakings in the first part of the test based on objective             
criteria that does not appear to have any internal basis within the Italian             
corporate tax system.  
 
This confusion is not helped by the ruling in the ​Gibraltar ​case where the              
different treatment of offshore companies is perfectly justified by the          
scheme of that system. There is no provision in the treaties that precludes             
disparate treatment of different kinds of companies when that results from           
the internal goal of a tax system. In my view the way one can understand the                
term “inherently selective” is that where one can conclude that the goal of a              
tax system is purely to boost the competitiveness of certain companies or            
make certain transactions more attractive this is not justified. In other words            
there is an as of yet undefined limited set of grounds for justification the              
126 C-6/12 ​P Oy ​(2013) para 29  
127 Conor Quigley, European State Aid Law and Policy (3rd ed. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2015) p. 114 
128 ​Joined Cases C-78-80/08, Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze and 
Agenzia delle Entrate v. Paint Graphos (2010) ECR I-07611​, para 5 
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ECJ will recognize. There seem to be no obstacle to a Member State             
instituting punitive taxes where that stems from environmental policy for          
example. Similar to assessments under the freedom of movement rules there           
may be legitimate and illegitimate goals a tax policy may pursue. If it is              
legitimate a measure will be treated as a “special” levy and as its own              
reference system. Otherwise it will be viewed from the broader view of the             
entire tax system in which every single undertaking should be treated           
equally.  
 
The case of ​Santander will likely be decisive on this point as it is currently               
back in the General Court where this part of the test is being considered.              
The goal of the Spanish measure is likely to boost the competitiveness of             
domestic companies internationally. If a Member State is entitled to set its            
own internal goals for its tax system there is not anything in the treaties that               
precludes this. However under the ​Gibraltar case law this is likely not a             
legitimate basis for differential treatment.  
 
The core issue is that there is no clear distinction between a comparability             
test carried out “in light of the objectives of the system” and a justification              
deriving from “the general scheme of the system”. However if the ECJ            
continue to take a broad view as to what constitutes comparable           
undertakings this distinction is important. It is not satisfactory that the           
legitimacy of the underlying measure in ​British Aggregates or ​Adria-Wien is           
taken as a given while a completely different test is used in ​Gibraltar             
because that system happen to look like a general income tax. It seems to              
me that the proper approach is to establish on the outset that all undertakings              
should be treated equally under tax law and then consider whether a given             
measure reflect a goal that is legitimate as a reason for differential            
treatment. This question as to how selectivity is actually to be determined is             
highly relevant for the cases analysed in the next section. 
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5: A New Frontier: Transfer     
Pricing and Article 107 
5.1 Introduction to Transfer Pricing 
As stated previously a problematic question in the tax area is the question of              
intragroup transactions. MNE:s can move assets across multiple        
jurisdictions within the group which presents a multitude of problems in           
regards to calculating their tax. An MNE can shift profits between           
jurisdictions by under- or overcharging for services or goods allowing them           
to shop for low tax jurisdictions. On the other hand taxable income needs to              
be allocated in a way which ensures that such transactions does not face             
double taxation. Transfer pricing rules are the tools which seek to address            
these problems by allowing tax authorities to allocate an MNE:s tax base in             
a way which reflects the actual value creation chain in a group. The key              
basis of these rules is the arm’s length principle agreed upon by the OECD.             
 129
 
The leading guidance on the rules of transfer pricing is laid down by the              
OECD in its transfer pricing guidelines. The arm’s length principle is           130
meant to ensure that transactions between related enterprises reflect         
equivalent transactions made by undertakings subject to normal market         
conditions. As the name implies the payments exchanged in such          
transactions should be within “arm’s length” of what would be expected if            
the companies involved abided by normal market forces i.e if the           
transactions were carried out by independent undertakings. If this rule is not            
followed the tax authority may adjust the company’s tax base upwards or            
downwards accordingly. The rule stems from Article 9 of the OECD Model            
Tax Convention : 131
 
“​Where a Contracting State includes in the profits of an enterprise of that State —               
and taxes accordingly — profits on which an enterprise of the other Contracting State has               
been charged to tax in that other State and the profits so included are profits which would                 
have accrued to the enterprise of the firstmentioned State if the conditions made between              
the two enterprises had been those which would have been made between independent             
enterprises, then that other State shall make an appropriate adjustment to the amount of the               
tax charged therein on those profits​”  132
 
129 OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015) p. 31 ff, for a full evaluation of the goals 
of transfer pricing see Schoueri, Luis; “Arm’s Length: Beyond the Guidelines of the 
OECD”, (Dec 2010) ​Bulletin for International Taxation​, p. 690 
130 OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015) 
131 Full name: OECD Model Tax Convention on Income and Capital (2014) 
132 See also Art. 7(2) in relation to PE:s 
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There are two kinds of analysis to be made under the arm’s length principle.              
A functionality analysis where the functions of, risks assumed and assets           
used by the involved parties are taken under consideration and using that            
information a comparability analysis is performed. The former is used to           
determine the role of the respective undertakings which are then utilised to            
find an appropriate comparable situation. Generally one of the involved          
parties is tested (“the tested party”), which party is tested depends on the             
functional analysis as it is preferable to test the party with the least complex              
role in the transaction. There are two kinds of comparables (“uncontrolled           
transactions”) that can be made, an internal comparability analysis is          
conducted by comparing the tested transaction with another transaction         
between the tested party and an independent one. An external comparable is            
when a similar party engaged in an equivalent transaction is compared to the             
tested party. In the OECD guidelines 5 different ways of carrying out the             133
comparability test is described. It does not establish a hierarchy between           
these methods but offer guidance as to when specific methods are more            
accurate. 
 
The simplest method for assessing an arm’s length price is the Comparable            
Uncontrolled Price (CUP) method. In essence this form of assessment          
entails the identification of a comparable transaction which is compared to           
the one undertaken in the case being tested. This is considered the most             
reliable way to establish a suitable standard for comparison but runs into            
issues if no sufficiently similar transaction can be found. The resale price            
method is similar and compares the price usually charged when an item is             
sold to that of the controlled transaction. The cost-plus method rely on an             
estimation of the cost incurred by the seller of a product to which a profit               
margin is then added derived from the margin applied in comparable           
transactions. These three methods are referred to as traditional transfer          
pricing methods and are generally preferred due to their relative simplicity.          
 134
 
In the Transactional Net-Margin Method (TNMM) the transfer price is          
estimated by analyzing the net profit relative to a profit indicator such as             
operating costs or total sales. A profit ratio is determined relative to the             
indicator chosen corresponding to what is observed in comparable         
transactions and then applied to the tested situation. This test has its strength             
in being more versatile than the traditional methods and is not affected to             
the same degree by the differences between different independent         
transactions. This as one would expect the net profit a comparable company            
operates under to be at a similar level. The transactional profit split            135
method is intended to be used in transactions involving parties which both            
133 OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015) p. 41-49 
134 Described in the OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational 
Enterprises and Tax Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015), p. 63-76 
135 OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015), p. 77 ff 
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carry out unique and valuable functions. It estimates the total profits from a             
given transactions and then seek to allocate these equitably between the           
parties based on what portion of the return they would have expected to gain              
in an uncontrolled transaction. These two are referred to as the           136
transactional profit methods. 
 
The approach taken by the OECD is not without criticism. First of all the              
rules as defined by the OECD are very imprecise which may lead to             
different versions of the arm’s length rule being applied across jurisdictions.           
That is not to mention the difficulties facing companies and tax authorities            
in trying to determine how to apply the rule in the first place due to that fact.                 
Secondly there are situations where finding reasonable comparables is not          
possible. This may be because of problems in accessing the relevant market            
information but also due to more fundamental reasons. Undertakings         
belonging to a single group may undertake transactions independent         
companies would not, stemming from the simple fact that the considerations           
of associated businesses acting together differ from those of independent          
enterprises. Finally there are instances where the conclusions reached under          
this principle may not reflect economic reality. This is particularly the case            
when one considers the boons of integrating into groups that exist, such as             
economies of scale. These benefits will be included in the arm’s length price             
calculation and the group may therefore lose out on the financial benefits of             
these perks.  137
 
5.2 Advanced Pricing Agreements 
APA:s are essentially predictions agreed upon by states and undertakings on           
how transfer pricing or other tax rules will be applied to specific            
circumstances. They serve an important purpose in counteracting some of          138
the disadvantages of the arm’s length test mentioned above. This is achieved            
by granting undertakings an ability to foresee how they will be taxed and             
plan accordingly. In this way they add an important level of transparency            
and certainty for businesses to what may otherwise be obscure laws. The use             
of APA:s further allows for more administrative expediency and         
effectiveness as tax authorities do not need to once again settle questions            
addressed in the original APA. Increased cooperation between tax         
authorities of different nations and various undertakings is another effect of           
this procedure that is often pointed to.  139
 
This system can also be misused by both states and undertakings. A state             
can grant undertakings so-called “sweetheart” deals which do not reflect the           
136OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015), p. 93 ff 
137 See OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and 
Tax Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015) p. 34 f 
138 OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015), p. 168 ff 
139 OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015), p. 173 f 
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arm’s length principle resulting in an undertaking paying an artificially low           
tax. APA:s entered into separately by various states with a single MNE may             
give rise to mismatches between the jurisdictions the MNE could exploit,           
for instance for the purpose of creating “stateless” income if both countries            
expect an income to be taxed in another jurisdiction. Inconsistent          
applications of the law in different APA:s by a tax authority hold major             
implications for the internal market as more (or less) favourable rules being            
applied to varying MNE:s risk hampering free competition. Another         
problematic feature of APA:s is that they are usually confidential and thus            
not available for public or other forms of scrutiny. These issues has been             
identified by both the OECD and the Commission.  140
 
The Commission released a staff working paper addressing issues related to           
APA:s in 2016 following concerns raised over its ongoing investigations          
into such arrangements. After affirming the importance of this tool for tax            141
authorities and that the practice of giving them out were itself compatible            
with EU law, the Commission described how they are to be assessed under             
State aid rules. The paper makes heavy use of references to the OECD             
guidelines with a few notable additions on part of the Commission. It is             
established that the CUP is considered by the Commission as the most            
appropriate method unless no suitable comparables can be found. If that is            
the case in the instance of the TNMM the Commission asserts that usage of              
operating expenses (the most commonly used) as the performance indicator          
of an undertaking is not always appropriate. Hence tax authorities need to            
carry out a proper analysis in order to assess which indicator will lead to the               
result best in line with the arm’s length principle. The Commission           
concludes that in cases where an outcome is not accurate and cannot be             
explained by the inherent uncertainty of the test an APA will be considered             
in manifest breach of the arm’s length principle. At this point the State aid              
prohibition is infringed. As we can extrapolate at this point the           142
Commission has its own interpretation of what constitutes arm’s length          
pricing and a failure to abide by it will put a Member State in breach of Art.                 
107. This approach is problematic in a number of ways. 
 
5.3 Comparability of Independent and Integrated      
Companies 
In a number of recent decisions the Commission considered APA:s which           
was ultimately not considered to abide by the arm’s length principle. In            
these cases the Commission criticizes the methodology used (in all cases the            
TNMM) and also substantive judgements of facts made in these rulings. 
140 OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015), p. 174 f and the Commission working 
paper on state aid and tax rulings (2016) as well as Peter Wattel, “Stateless 
Income, State Aid and the (which?) Arm’s Length Principle”, (2016) vol 44:11, 
Intertax​, p. 791, 791 f 
141 Commission working paper on state aid and tax rulings (2016) 
142 Commission working paper on state aid and tax rulings (2016), summary of the 
full document 
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These cases touches on a few interesting topics. The two first cases where             
the Commission reached a decision was ​Fiat ​and ​Starbucks . First of all            143 144
the Commission decides to define the system of reference as the general            
corporate income tax systems of Luxembourg and the Netherlands         
respectively. This is key to the Commission’s reasoning on the selectivity of            
the measures as they argue that Fiat and Starbucks has been granted aid             
when compared to other ​independent ​undertakings.  
 
Following this doctrine the Commission declared that the Netherlands had          
granted State aid to Starbucks. First of all royalties paid by a Dutch             
subsidiary to its parent company for know-how in coffee roasting were           
criticized. The Commission noted that the APA used the TNMM rather than            
the CUP despite the fact that there was suitable uncontrolled comparables           
available. Based on its own assessment the Commission considered the          145
worth of the underlying Intellectual Property(IP) to be zero as it was only             
the Dutch Starbucks company which paid any royalty for its usage of it.             146
The Commission continued to say that the contract were inherently          
unfavorable to the licensee in a way that would not have been acceptable for              
an independent actor. In subsidiary reasonings the Commission went on to           147
argue that the TNMM had in either case been incorrectly applied. Finally in             
regards to the pricing of green beans supplied within the group were            
considered to be outside of arm’s length. Starbucks had raised the prices of             
the green beans supplied and while the company tried to justify the increase             
these arguments were rejected by the Commission. Similarly, although the          148
Commission accepted the use of TNMM in the ​Fiat ​case it went on to poke               
holes in the methodology endorsed in the APA. The company subject to the             
APA provided the Fiat group with internal financing services. The indicator           
chosen in the TNMM analysis were the company’s regulatory capital          
instead of its accounting capital. The Commission estimated that this          
rendered Fiat’s tax base about ten times smaller than it should have been.  149
 
The first issue it is appropriate to explore is thus the assertion that             
undertakings that is part of a group is comparable to those who are not. Such               
a conclusion necessitates that the goal of any given transfer pricing regime            
or indeed any tax system in general is the equal treatment of these different              
kinds of companies. As pointed out by Raymond Luja this ideal does not             
necessarily correspond well to real life. A company that is part of a group              
has different considerations than two independent companies engaged in an          
individual transaction. This is the case since members of a group of            
undertakings have to also take into account the needs of the group as a              
143 Commission Decision SA.38375 ​Fiat​ (2015) O.J. L/351/2016 
144 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017 
145 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017,​ ​para 281-282 
146 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017,​ ​para 309 
147 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017,​ ​para 312-317 
148 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017,​ ​para 348-349 
149 Commission Decision SA.38375​ ​Fiat​ (2015) O.J. L/351/2016,​ ​para 256 
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whole. The problem inherent in following the arm’s length principle is that            
it requires a tax authority to compare an intragroup transaction to a            
hypothetical action by an independent company. This is why the test is            
considered to be at “arm’s length” as it is the result of an approximation of               
what an independent actor would do in the situation of an integrated            
undertaking. One of the main criticism of this approach is that it leads to tax               
authorities second guessing the business decisions of private companies.  150
 
The issue from Luja’s point of view appear to stem from the fact that              
independent actors do not have to be subject to these types of judgments             
where the tax authority puts an undertaking’s business strategy on trial.           
However if the transfer pricing rules are to achieve their original intent of             
avoiding double taxation and countering MNE:s shopping for low tax          
jurisdictions it is quite simply a necessity that special rules are applied to             
them in some capacity. The contradiction here is thus that even if transfer             
pricing rules were to be applied perfectly MNE:s would still not be treated             
the same as independent companies strictly speaking. It therefore bears to be            
questioned whether the Commission can actually insist that these two very           
different types of companies are comparable.  
 
The counterargument lies in the terminology of “in the light of the            
objectives intrinsic to the system” . The argument forwarded by the          151
Commission is that the goal of transfer pricing rules is or ought to be the               
equal taxation of grouped and independent companies. The criticisms in the           
above paragraphs concern transfer pricing rules based on the arm’s length           
principle in general rather than these specific procedures. Indeed the          
Commission itself observes this, noting that the goal of transfer pricing rules            
is to achieve parity in the taxation of independent and integrated companies.            
Considering this it makes little sense to accept that the transfer pricing            
system of the Member States be treated as its own reference system rather             
than the corporate tax system. This seeing as the State has not made a              
decision in the first place to treat these different kinds of companies            
differently, if anything quite the opposite. That conclusion is not changed           152
by designating transfer pricing rules as part of the general system or taking             
an approach similar to the ​Sardinia Stopover Tax case. Since there is bound             
to be areas where integrated and non-integrated companies compete the          
Gibraltar case implies that even in that case a system which treated the two              
groups differently would be liable to be labelled as inherently          
discriminatory.  
150  Raymond Luja, “State Aid Benchmarking and Tax Rulings: Can We Keep it 
Simple?”, in editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, Edoardo Traversa, ​State 
Aid Law and Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016) p. 114 ff 
151 Taken from Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as 
Referred to in Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European 
Union (2016), para 128 
152 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks​ (2015) O.J. L/83/2017,​ ​para 
236-237; Commission Decision SA.38375 ​Fiat​ (2015) O.J. L/351/2016,​ ​para 
198-199 
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Still the fact remains that MNE:s face separate treatment under special rules.            
So while it is true that these rules will apply exclusively to groups that is               
because they cannot be applied in practice or theory to independent           
enterprises. As a result there is no real difference between which of the tests              
suggested in the previous section you apply. No matter which the question is             
one of comparing the financial situation of the two kinds of companies after             
tax is paid without regard for the process of getting there, which is very              
different from one another and cannot be compared. Keep in mind that the             
transfer pricing rules are not technically about how much tax a company            
should pay but how much of its profit tax should be levied upon. This is               
done by deciding how an MNE:s profits should be allocated within that            
group. Since the determination of the profits of an independent company is            
–all things being equal– relatively straightforward the general corporate tax          
system will not provide for a general rule the transfer pricing rules can             
derogate from. Hence in any case the Commission cannot rely on showing            
unequal treatment purely as provided for in the tax rules to demonstrate that             
the integrated company is better off than it would have been if it was              
independent. This requires an autonomous concept of equality since         
otherwise the Commission cannot show that too much or little of the            
group’s total tax base has been allocated to a specific member, i.e in order to               
prove the existence of an advantage. 
 
Thus the Commission needs to identify what the normal taxation would           
have resulted in devoid of the selective advantage. Only the transfer pricing            
rules can provide an answer to this question. However since they themselves            
have resulted in the selective advantage the Commission is in the same            
position as in ​Gibraltar ​as it needs to apply a reference system where there              
is none available. The way the Commission has decided to address this is to              
use an autonomous EU concept of the arm’s length principle. 
 
5.4 An EU Arm’s Length Principle 
In all the cases regarding transfer pricing the Commission has used its own             
interpretation of the arm’s length principle. Although heavily reliant on the           
OECD guidelines it is not clear that this interpretation is completely in line             
with them in all respects. This is apparent in the Commission’s assertion            153
that there is a best method to apply in a given case. Hence the Dutch               
authorities had erred in using the TNMM in ​Starbucks and Luxembourg in            
Fiat had to justify its use of that same method. It follows from this same               
logic that in the case of the TNMM there is also a most appropriate              
performance indicator as shown in ​Fiat​. In none of these cases is the arm’s              
153 This is largely due to the Commission’s use of the term “prudent market 
operator”, the meaning of which is not clear in this context. See Werner Haslehner, 
“Double Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing and State Aid”, in editor: Isabelle 
Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, Edoardo Traversa, ​State Aid Law and Business 
Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016) p. 148 f, citing as an example 
Preliminary Decision SA.38944 ​Amazon​ (2014) O.J. C/44/2015, para 55 
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length principle’s existence in the national laws disputed. But by imposing           
an EU concept of that legal doctrine the Commission demands that the            
Member State apply a specific form of that principle as opposed to their             
own interpretations of it. 
 
The Commission’s application of the arm’s length principle reached its head           
in the ​Apple ​case . It concerned an APA between Ireland and Apple which             154
had a few features differentiating it from the previous two cases. First of all              
the two Apple companies involved were not considered resident under Irish           
tax law which resulted in them essentially being without a country of            
residence for tax purposes. Secondly there were no arm’s length principle           155
incorporated within Irish law and thirdly the two relevant APA:s were           
entered into in 1991 and 2007; before the OECD Council had adopted            
transfer pricing guidelines relating to non-resident branches. At the heart          156
of these proceedings were the question of where the IP of Apple were to be               
located. The Irish authorities had determined that this IP were not           
attributable to the Irish branches of the company and left it at that. In              
practice this meant the IP were allocated to the companies’ head offices in             
the US. 
 
The Commission argued first that the Irish authorities were mistaken in not            
assigning Apple’s IP to the Irish branch based on the lack of staff and active               
management by the directors at the head offices. Further the Commission           157
criticized the fact that Apple had failed to identify what part of the Irish              
branches’ sales constituted royalties to be subtracted from the total profits.           158
It also took issue with the allocation of R&D responsibilities with the logic             
that the Irish branches already contributed to such efforts through a Cost            
Sharing Agreement (CSA) thus debunking Apple’s claim that these         
activities should be allocated to the US parent company. In a subsidiary            159
line of reasoning the Commission familiarly argued that the choice of           
method (TNMM) and application of that method were incorrect.   160
 
This decision clearly show that the Commission is of the opinion that Art.             
107 requires the use of the arm’s length principle regardless of national law.             
The decision clearly states that any other method for profit allocation –at            
least insofar it reaches a different result– is contrary to the State aid             
prohibition. The fact that Ireland has not officially adopted any particular           
method for profit allocation and does not allow for taxation based on            
general principles under its constitution would thus be irrelevant since the           
doctrine of EU law supremacy gives the EU principle precedence over any            
154 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016) 
155 It was a so called “Double Irish” tax planning setup 
156 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 153-155 
157 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 280-282, final 
conclusion in para 304 
158 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 306-307 
159 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 312-318 
160 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 325-327 
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domestic rules. In spite of the fact that the Commission goes on to carry out               
a test using the OECD rules as the standard it keeps on insisting that it does                
not apply the OECD Guidelines directly but simply consider them “useful           
guidance”.   161
 
5.5 The Case of the Belgian Coordination Centres 
The basis for the Commission’s use of the arm’s length principle can be             
found in the 2006 ECJ ruling on the Belgian regime for coordination            
centres. This case reflects the Commission’s toughening stance on tax          162
competition as a regime previously authorised by it in 1984 ended up being             
rejected by the Commission following the renewed reviews initiated after          
the adoption of the Code of Conduct. The case concerned a tax regime             
which favored coordination centres, a kind of undertaking created by          
corporate groups to provide various internal services to its members. The           
benefits consisted of a standardized tax base based on the centre’s operating            
costs (based on the cost-plus method) sans staff costs and financial charges            
along with various exemptions.  
 
The ECJ sided with the Commission on the question whether the regime            
was compatible with the State aid prohibition. More specifically the court           
agreed that the exclusion of workforce and financial charges from the           
operating cost assessment did not reflect arm’s length prices (the court did            
not explicitly mention the arm’s length principle but instead referred to the            
“conditions of free competition”). Thus it was an advantage. As for           163
selectivity the regime were explicitly a derogation from the Belgian general           
tax system. More interestingly the court also held that the fact that only             
multinational entities fulfilling the criteria laid down could benefit from the           
regime rendered it selective. The Commission’s interpretation of this case          164
is that a failure by a member state to properly apply a rule on arm’s length                
transfer pricing is tantamount to State aid.  
 
The Commission’s reading of this case can and has been criticized. The            165
ECJ does not interpret the arm’s length principle as such but rather deals             
specifically with the cost-plus method. Secondly the court’s decision does          
not specify whether the conclusions reached are attributable to the features           
of the Belgian tax system or if this is indeed a generally applicable rule of               
the EU State aid regime. Finally that case regards the explicit exclusion of             
certain parameters (staff and financial costs) from the transfer pricing          
161 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016),​ ​para 254-257 
162 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479 
163 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479, para 96 
164 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479, para 122-123 
165 See Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, “EU State Aid Law and Transfer Pricing: A Critical 
Introduction to a New Saga”, (2016) vol 7:6, ​Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice​, p. 369, 379 ff 
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calculation –an obvious contradiction of what is described by the OECD– as            
opposed to a situation where an ostensibly OECD compliant methodology is           
being applied. Further it is of some note that the case identifies the             166
coordination centres “and the groups they belong to” as the beneficiaries.           167
It is difficult to parse this language but I would posit that it is not possible to                 
safely conclude that the intent of the court is to lay down a rule of equal                
treatment between groups and independent undertakings in general. As         
outlined in the previous section this requirement of equality likely exist but            
it is not clear from this case that the arm’s length principle is the rule               
through which this should be achieved. Another interpretation would be that           
the ruling relates to the special circumstances of the case and that            
coordination centres being uniquely available to groups as a form of           
undertaking is incidental to the court’s conclusion. Actually the court later           
criticizes the fact that the regime were exclusively available to groups of a             
certain size; rather than that standalone companies are ​de facto locked out            
from the system. Although it is worth stating that the court are never clear              168
what companies it refers to when discussing comparables elsewhere in the           
ruling, making it difficult to come to any definite conclusions in this regard.            
 169
 
This is thus not wholly solid ground for the far-reaching application the            
Commission is propagating for. There was some confusion when the          
Commission first took the decisions to start the investigations whether it           
was extending the MEOP to also encompass private undertakings as          
opposed to just the public sector. It is clear from how the final decisions              170
are written however that this is not the case. Rather the Commission thinks             
it has found a new arm’s length principle to be applied to private operators              
within EU law as an expression of the general principle of equal treatment.            
This casts Art. 107 not as a prohibition on aid but rather as an obligation                171
for Member States to ensure competitive equality of undertakings in the           
market place. A big difference between these cases and those previously           172
discussed is thus the argument that there is a positive obligation for Member             
166 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479 para 94-96 
167 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479 para 102 
168 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479 para 125 
169 Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479, For instance in paragraphs 104 and 107 the court refer to 
“every company” without ever singling out integrated companies specifically as the 
privileged group 
170 See for example Liza Lovdahl Gormsen, “EU State Aid Law and Transfer 
Pricing: A Critical Introduction to a New Saga”, (2016) vol 7:6, ​Journal of European 
Competition Law & Practice​, p. 369, 378 f 
171 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017, para 264; 
Commission Decision SA.38375 ​Fiat​ (2015) O.J. L/351/2016, para 228 
172 Peter Wattel, “Stateless Income, State Aid and the (which?) Arm’s Length 
Principle”, (2016) vol 44:11, ​Intertax​, p. 791, 791 f 
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States to apply a certain legal regime rather than a negative obligation to not              
institute measures resulting in unequal treatment. 
 
5.6 Other Legal Bases for an EU Arm’s Length         
Principle 
At the start of the proceedings investigating APA:s scholars Anna Gunn and            
Joris Luts identified three ways the OECD rules could be applied in the             
cases. Firstly as a starting point for an investigation where the Commission            
merely uses it as an indicator of potential State aid and later moves on to               
using the established three-step model. With the decisions now in hand we            
can tell that this is evidently not the case. Secondly the guidelines could be              
viewed as a part of the internal system of reference i.e as part of the national                
legislative framework. Whether this is possible is dependent on if and in that             
case how the arm’s length principle has been incorporated into national law.            
Finally these rules could be used as a reference system external to domestic             
law in which case these decisions heralds a departure from established           
practice.   173
 
If discrepancies between the national transfer pricing rules and the          
Commission’s interpretation lead to a presumption of State aid that needs to            
be rebutted it constitutes a reference system. Another feature of the           
decisions is the observation by the Commission that the OECD rules has            
been endorsed by the Member States by virtue of their participation in the             
OECD. However this fact does not support a conclusion that the guidelines            
are part of the national tax system. A tax treaty is generally regarded as              
lacking the capacity of extending taxation rights beyond what is provided           
for by national domestic law. This rule also apply to the OECD Model             
Convention. Even in the cases where the Member State has incorporated           174
an arm’s length principle the application of the guidelines would therefore           
be limited by domestic law. Considering this the Commission cannot validly           
argue that its own interpretation of that principle is part of the national             
reference framework if that is not supported by laws and legal precedent            
actually applied by the domestic authorities. In conclusion it would seem           175
like the Commission rather uses the guidelines as an external reference           
system. 
 
With that said the application of the arm’s length principle is not necessarily             
without merit. It is reflective of a general international consensus on transfer            
pricing, adopted by the OECD of which a majority of EU Member States             
are part. Further besides being used in the MEOP it has also seen use in the                
case law of the ECJ. In the free movement case ​Thin Cap GLO ​it was               
173 Anna Gunn and Joris Luts, “Tax Rulings, APAs and State Aid: Legal Issues”, 
(2015) vol. 24:2, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 119, 122 f 
174 Jens Wittendorf, “The Transactional Ghost of Article 9(1) of the OECD Model”, 
(2009) vol 63:3, ​Bulletin of International Taxation​, p. 107, 110 f 
175 Anna Gunn and Joris Luts, “Tax Rulings, APAs and State Aid: Legal Issues”, 
(2015) vol. 24:2, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 119, 123 
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determined that a failure to show that a transaction is within arm’s length of              
what would have been agreed between unrelated parties may be used as an             
indication of the artificiality of such a business arrangement. The          176
principle is further referred to in the ATAD as well as adopted verbatim             177
from the OECD Model Convention in the EU Transfer Pricing Arbitration           
Convention . However both of these only uses the concept loosely without           178
a standalone detailed definition and in the case of the ATAD only in relation              
to interpreting the rules of that directive. Thus they do not lend support to              
the idea of using it to counter tax competition like what is the case here.  179
 
Regardless there is no legitimate case that this principle can be used to             
extend the scope of domestic tax rules. In further support of this –as             
exemplified by the limitation in the Irish Constitution– tax rules are a            
particularly sensitive area in regards to legal certainty and legitimacy. I           180
have already pointed out the restrictions in regards to expanding tax rules by             
way of the Model Convention and as Werner Haslehner points out the            
OECD guidelines is at the end of the day issued by unelected technocrats             
after which they are confirmed by representatives of the members’          
governments (this decision would not be subject to ratification in a           
legislature). In terms of EU law the lack of competency for the Union in              181
the area of taxation should limit any expansive interpretation of          
international or EU trends in this respect. There is no support in the             
jurisprudence that the ECJ or the EU legislature endorse a mandatory legal            
doctrine in this area of law as the Commission suggest.  
 
As mentioned the Commission in the decisions themselves argues that the           
arm’s length principle is an expression of the general EU principle of equal             
treatment. Such general principles are only relevant when applying and          
interpreting EU law. As a result they are not capable of expanding the scope              
of EU legislation or competencies. I therefore seriously question the idea           182
that it is possible to introduce a highly complex set of mandatory rules like a               
transfer pricing regime using this logic. Considering the all-encompassing         
area of application of Art. 107 this would set a dangerous precedent in my              
opinion. It also still does not answer why the Commission consider its            
version of the arm’s length principle to be a suitable indicator of equal             
176 C-524/04, ​Test Claimants in the Thin Cap Group Litigation v. Commissioners of 
Inland Revenue ​(2007) ECR I-02107 para 77 
177 In the recital para. 14 and Articles 5(6) and 8(2) 
178 Convention (90/436/EEC) on the Elimination of Double Taxation in connection 
with the Adjustment of Profits of Associated Enterprises (1990), In Art. 4 
179 See Peter Wattel, “Stateless Income, State Aid and the (which?) Arm’s Length 
Principle”, (2016) vol 44:11, ​Intertax​, p. 791, 794 ff 
180 Wars have after all been fought over “no taxation without representation” 
181 Werner Haslehner, “Double Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing and State Aid”, in 
editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, Edoardo Traversa, ​State Aid Law and 
Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016) p. 149 
182 C-555/07, ​Kücükdeveci v. Swedex​ (2010) ECR I-00365 para 23 and see also 
Paul Craig and Gráinne de Búrca, ​EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials​ (6th ed. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) p. 195 f 
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treatment or State aid. The Commission seem content with relying on the            
Belgian Coordination Centres case law as justification of its choice of           
method but this assumption is very much open to criticism. 
 
5.7 Is the Arm’s Length Principle a Good Indicator of          
State Aid? 
Even if the Commission’s use of the arm’s length principle is accepted by             
the courts it is not necessarily a good litmus test for State aid. While transfer               
pricing laws may be prima facie selective the logic in previous State aid             
cases that a finding of selectivity is enough for a presumption of advantage             
and imputability does not necessarily hold true. The primary problem is that            
transfer pricing is far from an exact science. Even if the Commission arrives             
at an exact EU definition of the principle there are still questions to be              
raised in the context of the scope of the State aid assessment. Art. 107 is               
only relevant in regards to the situation within the Member State concerned.            
It follows from the requirement of imputability that a Member State cannot            
be held responsible for the actions of another state. In addition by that fact              
and the nature of the selectivity criterion only advantageous treatment in           
relation to the domestic market of a Member State is relevant for the State              
aid analysis. In instances where we are faced with the taxation of MNE:s             
these limitations presents potential difficulties the Commission has to         
address in these cases. 
 
Since the comparison being drawn is between independent companies and          
groups in light of the general corporate tax system the difference in            
treatment being scrutinized concern the size of the tax base. This is so             
because transfer pricing rules is ultimately about the allocation of taxable           
income within a group of companies and in the case of MNE:s this by effect               
means allocation of taxation rights between jurisdictions. In other words the           
concern regarding a misapplication of transfer pricing rules should be that           
MNE:s end up not paying taxes on the same profits as domestic            
undertakings in the relevant country. In regards to non-residents the correct           
tax base would be reflective of all profits derived from the host state.             
Meanwhile residents should be taxed on its full worldwide income. The           
arm’s length principle in this instance would be a tool for the Commission             
–just as is the case for national authorities– to determine the correct tax base              
for an integrated company. This logic is consistent with the single country            
approach of Art. 107 as a Member State’s refusal to tax the same income for               
both kind of undertakings could be characterised as a derogation from the            
general tax regime. By this logic it would not matter whether the same             
income was taxed or not in another State after the fact; the only question is               
how much the state that may have granted the aid has taxed the undertaking.              
If the tax base for an MNE after an application of transfer pricing rules (in               
accordance with an APA or otherwise) does not accurately reflect its income            
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from that state it would be held to constitute an advantage awarded through             
state resources.  183
 
The alternative to this logic –which it regrettably would appear that the            
Commission has chosen– is the argument that there is a positive obligation            
on Member States to apply an EU arm’s length principle. A failure to do so               
would then automatically be in violation of Art. 107. This would mean that             
Member States would effectively be required to impose market conditions          
on MNE:s in order to put them and independent enterprises on equal            
footing. This is not in line with Art. 107 since a different approach to              
transfer pricing rules in and of itself is not enough to prove the existence of               
an advantage or which state’s resources has been used.  
 
The ​Apple ​case exemplifies this very well. The Irish authorities based the            
profit allocations in the APA on the mere fact that the head offices of the               
Apple companies were not located in Ireland without determining where          
they were actually located. As the companies were not considered resident           
in either Ireland or the US for tax purposes any income not attributable to              
the Irish branches were stateless. The assumption of the Irish authorities that            
a majority of the profits stemmed from the Apple IP is not questioned by the               
Commission. The conclusion that is contested by the Commission is that           
this IP is located outside of Ireland for the purposes of the transfer pricing              
analysis. According to the Commission the fact that the head offices had            184
no capacity to manage the IP means it had to be located in the Irish branch.               
However as argued by the Irish authorities this is not reflective of             185
economic reality either as the Irish branches cannot be reasonably          
considered to possess the capability to generate these relatively enormous          
profits themselves. In reality the profit attributable to the Apple IP should            
likely be allocated to the Apple group’s headquarters in the US (Apple,            
Inc.). The Commission correctly points out that these profits should be           186
dealt with through the CSA between the Irish branches and Apple, Inc.            
which is not at issue in the current proceedings.  187
 
In other words there should likely be an upward adjustment in the CSA if              
the payments prescribed there is not in line with market conditions. This            
should arguably matter for the question of whether State aid has been            
granted or not though. It would seem that if the payments of the Irish              
branches through the CSA had been higher and corresponded to the profits            
allocated to the head office the Commission would not have an issue with             
183 For the same line of reasoning see: Werner Haslehner, “Double Taxation Relief, 
Transfer Pricing and State Aid”, in editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, 
Edoardo Traversa, ​State Aid Law and Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin 
Heidelberg 2016) p. 150 ff 
184 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 266-275 
185 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 276-307 
186 This same conclusion is reached in Peter Wattel, “Stateless Income, State Aid 
and the (which?) Arm’s Length Principle”, (2016) vol 44:11, ​Intertax​, p. 791, 798 ff 
187 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 310-315 
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the arrangement, at least not on the same grounds as in this decision. It is               188
questionable whether the Apple companies in Ireland have actually received          
any advantage from Ireland if these profits could actually be allocated to            
entities in the US anyway. In that scenario it is the US rather than Ireland               
which would have granted the aid by failing to tax these profits. The             
Commission’s approach is overly technical and fails to address the fact that            
the Irish companies relatively small size clearly indicates they cannot be           
solely responsible for the profits posted. This is not resolved by the fact that              
Ireland in their recovery may reduce Apple’s tax burden if part of that             
amount is found to be attributable to other States by for instance retroactive             
changes to the CSA. The purpose of the procedure is to establish whether             189
illegal aid has been granted by Ireland and this assessment should not be             
affected by the tax interests or actions of other countries. 
 
The Commission’s application of the arm’s length principle in this case is            
not capable of clearly demonstrating that Apple has actually been granted an            
advantage in relation to other Irish undertakings. Since the Apple companies           
are not residents for tax purposes in Ireland they should not have to pay tax               
on income attributable elsewhere. This follows ​a contrario from the ​British           
Aggregates ​case law. Anything else would mean that undertakings in a           
competitive relationship with Apple would be granted a selective advantage          
instead (since the effective tax rate would be too high on Apple’s Irish             
income). As a result it is not enough to show that Ireland has misapplied the               
arm’s length principle in regards to a particular transaction, the Commission           
must show that the total tax levied on the Apple companies is actually too              
small if it is to prove the existence of an advantage. This is a direct result of                 
the Commission choosing the general corporate tax system as its frame of            
reference, it is not possible to prove an advantage relative to that system             
without first calculating the correct tax base. The Commission’s simplistic          
approach may have been reasonable if the subject of the proceedings were a             
generally applicable scheme, but since it concerns an individual decision          
addressed to specific persons it is completely justified to require the           
Commission to also take into account whether the remuneration provided          
for in the CSA is too low.  
 
In conclusion the assertion that a failure to abide by the arm’s length             
principle in an individual decision or transaction is by itself enough to            
presume the existence of an advantage imputable to the State is faulty. In             
order to arrive at a conclusion in that regard a broader view must be taken in                
regards to the total tax liability of the undertaking in question. 
 
5.8 Belgian Excess Profit – A General Scheme 
This is reminiscent of the Belgian ​Excess Profit ​case . This ​case concerned            190
a Belgian scheme whereby companies resident in Belgium were allowed to           
188 As indicated in Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 450 
189 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 448-450 
190 Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016 
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apply for participation in a scheme where so called residual profit were            
deducted from the tax base of group entities. Belgium would calculate the            
profit a hypothetical average independent company would make in the same           
circumstances as the group entity and the tax base could effectively not            
exceed this average. This was justified in the view of Belgium by the fact              
that group entities benefits from intragroup synergies, economies of scale          
and other factors not available to an independent entity. In order to            
determine the average for comparison the TNMM were used. From this           
method the authorities would arrive at an adjusted arm’s length profit which            
would be converted to a percentage representing the portion of profit the            
group undertaking could exempt from taxation. This estimate was supposed          
to be tested after three years where it could be adjusted retroactively, but             
such a readjustment never actually took place during the lifetime of the            
measure. Belgium argued that the scheme served to avoid double taxation           191
and is in line with the logic of the arm’s length principle since the excess               
profits cannot be attributed to Belgium. If this excess profit is not taxed             
anywhere else –the argument goes– then that is not due to any fault of              
Belgium’s.  192
 
Once again the Commission argues for the general corporate income tax as            
the system of reference. The reasoning here is the same as previously as the              
system seek to tax all resident companies actual profits. Since the transfer            
pricing rules aims to put MNE:s on equal footing as other companies a             
unilateral downward adjustment to the tax base cannot be considered part of            
that system. In an interesting additional line of argumentation the          
Commission note that only large MNE:s with significant economies of scale           
and synergy advantages would be able to find benefit from the scheme.  193
 
The approach chosen by Belgium is not in line with the arm’s length             
principle as any residual profit as a rule should be granted to the party              
assuming the more complex tasks. Since the Belgian scheme considered the           
Belgian side of the transaction the “central entrepreneur” it does not make            
sense under that principle to not allocate the residual benefits to that            
undertaking. The scheme is inconsistent in that it considers the          194
beneficiaries of the scheme the more complex party when testing the actual            
transfer pricing profits and then treat it as the tested party in the second step               
when the amount of residual profit is determined. The Commission then           
went on to dismiss the claim that the measure were justified in order to              
avoid double taxation, as it should in that case be necessary for the             
beneficiaries to prove that the residual profits has been taxed somewhere           
else before they are exempted.  195
 
191 Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016, para 21 
192 Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016, para 
78-84 
193 Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016, 138-140 
194 Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016, 156 
195 Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016, para 181 
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This case is noteworthy as it regards first of all a clearly defined generally              
applicable measure being overruled by the Commission due to a failure to            
abide by the arm’s length principle. The scheme made use of the fact that              
MNE:s inherently enjoy competitive boons independent companies does        
not. These kind of advantages are the very reason companies integrate in the             
first place and is not part of transactions between independent companies.           
The OECD has observed this and have proposed that these kinds of            
synergies should be split between the members of the group in relation to             
their respective contribution to their existence. The problem from the          196
perspective of the arm’s length principle is that Belgium appear to simply            
conclude that said synergies does not belong to the Belgian company           
without any further analysis, giving rise to double non-taxation of those           
profits in instances where they end up being attributed to other members of             
the group in an overstated manner.   197
 
As pointed to by Haslehner the way the Commission makes use of the arm’s              
length principle is consistent with its earlier approach. Rather than focusing           
on rules reflecting the economic reality that groups can often be more            
efficient than independent undertakings; the Commission is more concerned         
with putting these two kinds of companies on an equal playing field from a              
competition perspective. However if the point of comparison is         198
independent companies should profits that is not available to those          
companies (outside of the arm’s length margin) be taxed from a ​State aid             
perspective? If the purpose of the Commission’s arm’s length principle is to            
treat these two types of companies the same should this not work both             
ways? In other words downwards adjustments like this should be possible           
assuming that a proper analysis is carried out in determining to what extent             
these profits is attributable to the company being taxed. Even if this leads to              
a situation of double non-taxation the arm’s length principle should not be            
an obstacle to a rule such as this. It is however important to note that the                
measure also contained features encouraging companies to move additional         
business to Belgium in order to enjoy benefits. Along with the lack of             
proper analysis on the part of the Belgian authorities this limits the case’s             
usefulness in determining any legal doctrine laid down in the decision in            
this regard.   199
 
Similar to the Apple case the Commission is not able to prove in this case               
that the profits being excluded is definitely attributable to the Belgian           
196 OECD, ​Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10: 
Final Reports​, (2015) OECD Publishing, p. 47 ff 
197 Raymond Luja, “State Aid Benchmarking and Tax Rulings: Can We Keep it 
Simple?”, in editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, Edoardo Traversa, ​State 
Aid Law and Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016) p. 123 f 
198 Werner Haslehner, “Double Taxation Relief, Transfer Pricing and State Aid”, in 
editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, Edoardo Traversa, ​State Aid Law and 
Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016), p. 157 
199 See Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016, para 
115 
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companies. However the distinction between a general scheme and         
individual decisions is important in this regard. Belgium cannot viably claim           
it has demonstrated that the profits are not attributable to the Belgian            
undertakings either nor can it be excluded that the scheme allows for profits             
that should be allocated to the Belgian companies end up being untaxed.            
Thus even if a scheme similar to the one at hand may be justified the               
Belgian implementation of it is at the very least not proportional to the goal              
pursued. 
 
5.9 Transfer Pricing Rules as the Reference System 
If the arm’s length standard is not upheld by the courts there are two              
possibilities for finding State aid using the domestic transfer pricing rules as            
reference system; that the tax authorities has derogated from existing legal           
practice or that their discretion is too wide. As pertains to the former it is a                
question of finding comparable instances where the transfer pricing rules          
have been applied differently. The problem with this is first of all that the              
Commission needs to find comparable cases which in itself can be difficult.            
Intragroup transactions needs to be considered in their entirety and as such            
even slight differences can be valuable for the final decision whether to            
adjust the price. Second of all it needs to be determined which decision             
constitute the general system if the Commission is faced with only two            
differing ones, although in this case as previously mentioned the least           
beneficial one would likely be used as the “normal” tax. Thirdly there is the              
fact that these rules are often not consistently applied at all by tax             
authorities, a matter the Commission brings up repeatedly. Finally APA:s          200
are secret, meaning that cases based on comparisons between different          
APA:s are difficult to meaningfully discuss or analyse as case law.   201
 
The Commission comes close in ​Starbucks ​where it notes that the guidelines            
provided by the tax authority explaining the Dutch transfer pricing system           
clearly states that the OECD rules are transposed into national law.           202
However the lack of clarity of the OECD guidelines previously described           
makes it difficult to assert that different interpretations of them constitutes           
derogations from the domestic law. When it comes to instances where the            
guidelines are not clear such as in regard to the choice of method or              
assessments of the facts of a case the Commission would still be required to              
find legal precedent in the national law to prove that a decision indeed             
derogates from this reference system. As such it is in my estimation not             
enough for the Commission to simply replace the Netherlands’         
interpretation of those guidelines with its own. 
 
200 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 371-377; 
Commission Decision SA.38375​ ​Fiat​ (2015) O.J. L/351/2016, para 321-336 
201 See: Raymond Luja, “State Aid Benchmarking and Tax Rulings: Can We Keep it 
Simple?”, in editor: Isabelle Richelle, Wolfgang Schön, Edoardo Traversa, ​State 
Aid Law and Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016) p. 120 f 
202 Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017, para 411 
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Due to the difficulty of comparing different APA:s the question of the limits             
of tax authorities’ discretion may be more interesting. In ​Fiat and ​Apple            203 204
the Commission argues that it is not possible to meaningfully use the            
national transfer pricing rules as a reference system as these are too vaguely             
written and not consistently applied. This is directly related to the           
Commission’s complaints regarding the choice of profit indicator in ​Fiat​,          
the price increase of green beans in ​Starbucks and the allocation of the IP in               
Apple to name a few. In all of those cases the tax authorities fails to explain                
their reasoning as to why these parts are in line with the arm’s length              
principle or any other method for profit allocation.  
 
This can be scrutinized under the doctrine referred to in ​P​. If the tax              
authority have a large area of discretion that is not limited by objective             
criteria (in line with the internal goals of the tax system) the decisions of              
that authority is liable to give rise to a selective advantage. In the realm of               
advanced tax rulings it would be reasonable that an application of transfer            
pricing rules in a system devoid of specific provisions guiding and limiting            
the tax authorities discretion falls afoul of Art. 107 on this basis. For             
example where it regards the choice of which method for calculation to use             
it is not satisfactory that a tax authority can choose freely between them             
when they may result in different outcomes. On the other hand the sheer             
complexity involved in the application of these rules requires a large degree            
of autonomy on the part of the tax authority. It seems to me however that               
this is the central issue, the fact that tax authorities are relatively free in              
handing out sweetheart deals under these rules. Particularly since the lack of            
transparency in the system means that there is no real consequence of the             
authorities using their discretion liberally as it will not be subject to public             
scrutiny or litigation from anyone not party to the APA.  
 
In ​P ​however that discretion regards the application of an exception and            
thus the “normal” situation is easily identifiable. A narrower reference          205
system does not solve the fundamental issue of finding a suitable benchmark            
for comparison in transfer pricing cases. This may very well be the reason             
for the Commission’s choice to use the corporate income tax systems as            
reference; it is very difficult to conclusively show that the tax authorities’            
rulings diverge from established national law. The exception to this is the            
Excess Profit ​case which is explicitly framed as an exception and appear to             
not be based on purely objective factors.  
 
203 Commission Decision SA.38375​ ​Fiat​ (2015) O.J. L/351/2016, para 321-336 
204 Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016), para 371-377 
205 See also: Joint Cases T-92/00 and T-103/00, ​Territorio Histórico Álava and 
Others v. Commission​ (2002) ECR II-01385 
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6. Analysis: The Expanding    
Scope of Art. 107 
6.1 Is the Commission’s Approach to Transfer Pricing        
Compatible with Art. 107? 
As demonstrated throughout this analysis the Commission’s approach in         
these cases raises a lot of questions. In my view the Commission is correct              
to argue that integrated and independent undertakings ought to be treated           
equally as this is the ostensive purpose of transfer pricing laws; to allow for              
corporate tax to be effectively levied on corporate groups. The problem lies            
with the implementation of the arm’s length principle in these decisions.           
This principle alone is not capable to prove the existence of an advantage by              
virtue of state resources and find poor support in prior case law or other EU               
legal doctrine. However without this tool it is not likely the Commission            
would be able to carry out a proper test due to the difficulty to use the                
domestic transfer pricing systems as a reference framework. Even so I will            
now put forward the arguments for why I feel the courts should ultimately             
reject the Commission’s proposed method in these cases. I will also explain            
how the ECJ’s inconsistent application of the selectivity test in the case law             
led to these decisions, thus making the argument that the ECJ should take             
this opportunity to clarify and limit its previous case law. 
 
6.2 From Negative to Positive Integration 
These cases aptly illustrates the problems with the increasingly expansive          
interpretation of Art. 107 in current jurisprudence. Pursuant of the          
objectives of transfer pricing laws integrated and independent undertakings         
should be treated equally. The issue the Commission faces is how to find a              
workable reference framework.  
 
There are two competing tests that can be divined from the case law. As              
indicated by ​Santander ​in the three-step test one demonstrates that there are            
a derogation from a general framework. However since the undertakings          
still need to be in comparable legal and factual situations for a selective             
advantage to be at hand this distinction is of academic importance. Rather            
the point is to identify two comparable undertakings facing differing          
treatment from which one can conclude selectivity regardless of the legal           
structure of the regime. In ​Gibraltar the ECJ opened the door to use a              
hypothetical reference system if national legislation did not provide for one           
naturally. The issue with this approach is that it presumes a “normal” state             
of affairs where undertakings are easily comparable independent of the tax           
system. This is particularly problematic when undertakings considered to be          
comparable can be as broad as every undertaking in a Member State, which             
is the necessary conclusion of using the general corporate income tax as the             
point of reference. 
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As we have seen in the cases concerning APA:s this require an autonomous             
definition of that “normal” state of an undertaking since transfer pricing           
rules are not conferrable onto independent undertakings. This was         
foreshadowed in the ​Gibraltar ​and ​Sardinia Stopover Tax cases as the ECJ            
simply conclude that certain undertakings are taxed less than their          
competitors without much significant analysis in regards to the other parts           
of the test. However when applied to a more complex system this is             
significantly more difficult to simply conclude. The Commission ends up          
having to define a methodology to use in order to determine at what point              
parity has been achieved between the tax bases of MNE:s and domestic            
undertakings. What results is a rigid and complex set of rules being ​de facto              
imposed on all Member States.  
 
The simplistic assumption that an advantage by means of State resources           
can be presumed if a tax measure is shown to be selective is the primary               
cause of this. It absolves the Commission of the burden to prove that a              
measure is tantamount to a transfer from state to undertaking meaning that            
the Commission’s (or ECJ’s) definition of the “normal” state does not have            
to regard the domestic tax system at all. The Commission takes this to its              
natural conclusion with its insistence that its arm’s length principle is           
mandatory for the Member States to apply. At this point the Commission is             
essentially implying that Member States have an obligation to ensure          
through tax law that independent and integrated companies compete on          
equal terms. In effect the Member States are now required to ​implement ​a             
measure in order to avoid falling afoul of Art. 107 even if it is foreign to                
their respective tax systems. This is unlike previous cases where Art. 107            
would only ​stop ​measures resulting in State aid. 
 
In other words one could say that the ECJ opened pandora’s box when it              
introduced the concept of inherently discriminatory systems and        
hypothetical benchmarks into the case law. This gives the Commission a           
wide open space for interpreting what constitutes equivalent treatment.         
Examples of measures which could potentially be questioned under this          
doctrine could for instance be different environmental levies. If a Member           
State introduce separate regulatory taxes on activities doing different kinds          
of damage to the environment (say a water polluting activity and an air             
polluting one) it is not out of this world to wonder whether concerns about              
the competitiveness of the domestic market may enter into the          
decision-making process. Would the Commission then be entitled to enter          
its own quantification of the damage caused by the various activities as a             
benchmark? On its face this seem like an obvious policy matter within the             
sphere of competence of the Member States. But in a world where the             
Gibraltar case exist this is far from certain. After all it seems equally valid              
to claim that which methodology to use to calculate equitable tax bases for             
MNE:s and domestic actors is a matter of policy. In the same vein             
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Gibraltar’s decision which factors of production to tax is most certainly a            
policy question.  
 
The fact that the Commission may not go that far in its enforcement policy              
does not alter the fact that all but the most general of tax rules could               
potentially be subject to harmonization by unelected EU authorities. This          
cannot in my view be considered to be the intent of the State aid rules.               
There can be no mistaking however that the arm’s length principle the            
Commission desire to implement is in effect a harmonization of the transfer            
pricing rules in the EU. 
 
6.3 The Irrelevance of the Justification Criterion 
This problem of a wide reaching definition of comparability would be           
mitigated by a more active use of the justifiability criterion. This would not             
stop the fact that significant parts of Member States autonomy in the area of              
taxation would be restrained. But it would allow for the ECJ to establish             
safe havens where for instance in the area of the environment the Member             
States would be allowed wider discretion. To distinguish the grounds of           
justification from the “general scheme of the system” criterion is          
particularly important where hypothetical or external reference systems are         
used. It is worth noting that in both ​Gibraltar ​and the transfer pricing cases              
the Member States are robbed of their ability to justify the measures under             
their own rules. Instead they need to argue in line with the reference system              
the Commission or the ECJ has chosen to apply. Indeed the cases looked at              
in this paper rather heavily imply that the only guiding principle the ECJ             
and the Commission recognizes is the one of equal treatment, which           
explains why this part seem to be constantly conflated with the           
comparability test.  
 
The reason for treating MNE:s and independent companies separately is          
obvious considering the different parameters involved in assessing their tax          
liability. Thus the argument that the different treatment is necessary for the            
functioning of the system is strong. This is however bypassed by the State             
aid test focusing on the effect of a measure rather than its goals. The              
Commission consequently does not have to concern itself with the way the            
systems functions if it can show that the outcome is not equitable. Hence             
this entire point of assessment is completely without meaning if          
comparability is determined independent of national law. 
 
6.4 Negative Integration does not bring Legal Certainty 
That line of argument touches on the next reason why I think that the ECJ               
should ultimately reject the Commission’s arguments in the transfer pricing          
cases; the aspect of legal certainty. This principle has a central role in the              
area of tax law. However negative integration through prohibitive rules in           
the TFEU is not capable of delivering this. All we can divine from the cases               
before us in regards to transfer pricing is how the Commission consider the             
rules apply to these specific cases’ circumstances. In spite of this we are             
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also told that all group transactions is subject to a vague set of rules of what                
the Commission consider to be within arm’s length. The Commission’s          
caginess as to what degree it is applying the already imprecise OECD            
guidelines as opposed to a system of its own devise is naturally not helpful.              
This is once again echoing of ​Gibraltar and touched upon again in            
Santander​. In the former it is not clear which specific points makes it an              
inherently discriminatory general system as opposed to a collection of          
special levies besides the fact that offshore companies happen to be           
comparatively better off. Similarly in ​Santander regardless of that case’s          
ultimate outcome it is not clear when cross-border transactions will be           
considered to be comparable to their purely domestic counterparts and when           
that will not be the case.  
 
The ECJ and the Commission seem to simultaneously want to avoid the            
problem of Member States making legislation that artificially get around the           
State aid prohibition the way the Gibraltar government attempted while still           
paying lipservice to the idea of Member State sovereignty in tax matters.            
The result is an unforgivable lack of clarity as to when a Member State is               
not in breach of Art. 107. Any undertaking with an APA now has no              
recourse to know with certainty whether the APA is actually allowed under            
the EU rules short of having the tax authorities give notice to the             
Commission under the procedure laid down in Art. 108. As regard other tax             
laws one can only speculate where the Commission finds the next legal            
principle expressing equal treatment allowing it to harmonize another area          
of law. 
 
6.5 Specific Decisions versus Abstract Comparables 
This leads us to the next point worthy of discussion: the Commission’s            
decision to scrutinize individual decisions as opposed to the general rules           
themselves. This is a shortcut the Commission takes in order to get around             
the vacuousness and inconsistent application of domestic transfer pricing         
rules while still approximating the law of the Member States. It is evident             
the Commission’s goal in these decisions are to impact how the Member            
States apply their transfer pricing regimes. However it leads to questionable           
consequences as in Apple where the Commission ends up with a conclusion            
not reflective of economic reality. Further in all of these cases it requires the              
Commission to make complex assessments of factual circumstances rather         
than abstract legal definitions. This puts the Commission in the position of            
an appeals court second-guessing the assessments of tax authorities. It          
seems doubtful the Commission ought to make a habit out of this as a              
decision by a tax authority is not whether to hand out aid but rather to               
determine the proper level of taxation for a taxpayer. We have already seen             
in ​Starbucks ​an instance where the Commission appear to endeavour to           
interpret Dutch national law by enforcing its own interpretation of what           
constitutes a transposition of the OECD guidelines, which is not part of the             
Commission’s duties. The Commission is not an EU level tax authority and            
an incorrect application of national law is a domestic matter not a State aid              
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issue. The Commission ought to limit its purview in this area to where tax              
decisions result in manifest breaches of a Member State’s law or legal            
practice; which has not been proven in the transfer pricing cases described            
here. 
 
The exception is seen in the ​Excess Profits ​case. There the approach of             
comparing an abstract actor under the Belgian special regime and one           
subject to the ordinary tax rules is easily demonstrable as one only need to              
identify more preferential rules under the special measure. However in the           
case of decisions addressed to individuals the Commission cannot simply          
impose its own interpretation of what the outcome ought to be without first             
showing how the decision actually diverge from the Member State’s law. If            
the issue under Art. 107 concern an individual decision then it should            
reasonably be compared to other decisions under the same law. If as in these              
cases the concern actually regards the law the decision were taken under, the             
Commission should test whether the law or the legal practice surrounding it            
are in breach of Art. 107 in order to ensure consistency.  
 
6.6 Final Conclusion 
This leads us to the point that the domestic laws are poorly written and the               
fact that some Member States may not be applying them in a sincere way              
(i.e they use them as a tool of tax competition). While one may be              
sympathetic to the goals the Commission is pursuing the State aid rules are             
not an appropriate tool for achieving them. We should recall the opinion of             
Advocate General Geelhoed that the State aid rules are a ​lex specialis to Art.              
116 and 117. In scenarios where the Commission cannot show a transfer            
between state and undertaking these rules should take precedence.  
 
To circle back to the beginning of this essay and the topic of harmful tax               
competition the State aid rules should not be the primary solution to this             
issue. Due deference should be left to the Member States in regards to             
taxation measures and they should be allowed to set their own internal goals             
for their legislation. Only in instances where it can be shown the Member             
States actually forego revenue that would have otherwise fallen to them by            
way of a derogation should State aid be a concern. The onus on proving this               
is on the Commission which should not have the power to design its own              
reference system to circumvent its own burden of proof. Thus the ECJ in my              
opinion must severely restrict the ​Gibraltar ​case law and limit the State aid             
test to use reference systems with foundations in the domestic law of the             
Member States. 
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7. Conclusions 
This paper has investigated four recent decisions taken by the Commission           
in regards to transfer pricing rules and State aid. The conclusions reached            
are that these are part of a trend of a major expansion of the definition of                
State aid in the area of taxation. This stems from the Commission’s use of              
its own interpretation of the OECD’s arm’s length principle as an external            
reference system. The reason for this choice is the lack of a proper reference              
system in the national laws due to vague and inconsistently applied rules.            
However this expansion has the effect of harmonizing transfer pricing rules           
to be in line with the Commission’s interpretation of the arm’s length            
principle.  
 
This result follow from the inconsistent application of these rules in the            
ECJ’s case law. Although the State aid definition ostensibly require an           
advantage through a grant of state resources in tax law it is often enough to               
merely prove that a competitive advantage exist. This is due to the supreme             
importance placed by the court on the comparability test. This reached its            
head in the ​Gibraltar case where the ECJ ruled that a collection of tax              
measures intended to replace a general corporate income tax was          
“inherently selective”. This appears to open the door for finding tax           
measures selective purely on the basis of a discrimination test. This test is             
significantly more opaque and potentially more restrictive than that test          
carried out in other parts of EU law due to the narrow definition of the               
justifiability criterion.  
 
In its transfer pricing decisions the Commission uses the arm’s length           
principle as a litmus test for State aid. This is despite the fact that the basis                
for this principle in EU law is weak. Although the Commission is correct in              
holding that transfer pricing should put MNE:s in the same position as            
independent companies relative to the general corporate income tax, this          
does not mean that the Commission is at liberty to implement its own             
reference system. The way it has chosen to apply this principle however            
leads to outcomes which are neither reflective of economic reality nor is it             
capable of proving the existence of an advantage by way of state resources.             
However –due to the underlying rules’ vagueness– if the Commission has to            
use domestic law as the reference system it is likely that it will not be               
possible to prove the existence of a selective advantage. 
 
This paper nevertheless argues that such an outcome is preferable to the            
Commission’s proposed method. The latter infringes too much on the tax           
sovereignty of the Member States. This approach is also problematic from           
the perspective of legal certainty and the autonomy of domestic authorities           
in their application of national law. The far reaching consequences of           
allowing the Commission to define equal treatment independent of the          
national legal systems leads this author to argue for the ECJ to take a more               
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restrictive approach in future case law. 
  
64 
 
Åke Häggqvist 
Lund University 
Spring 2017 
Table of References 
 
Bibliography: 
 
Bacon, Kelyn; ​European Community Law of State Aid​ (2nd ed. Oxford University 
Press, Oxford 2013) 
 
Craig, Paul and de Búrca, Gráinne; ​EU Law: Text, Cases and Materials​ (6th ed. 
Oxford University Press, Oxford 2015) 
 
Lang, Michael; Pistone, Pasquale; Schuch, Josef; Staringer, Claus; ​Introduction to 
European Tax Law: Direct Taxation​ (4th ed. Linde Verlag, Wien 2016) 
 
Quigley, Conor; ​European State Aid Law and Policy​ (3rd ed. Hart Publishing, 
Oxford 2015) 
 
Richelle, Isabelle; Schön, Wolfgang; Traversa, Edoardo; ​State Aid Law and 
Business Taxation​ (Springer-Verlag Berlin Heidelberg 2016) 
 
Academic Articles 
 
Elkins, David,”The Merits of Tax Competition in a Globalized Economy”, (2016) 
Vol. 91:3, ​Indiana Law Journal​, p. 905 
 
Genschel, Philipp; Kemmerling, Achim; Seils, Eric; “Accelerating Downhill: How the 
EU Shapes Corporate Tax Competition in the Single Market”, (2011) vol 49:3, 
Journal of Common Market Studies​, p. 585 
 
Gunn, Anna and Luts, Joris;, “Tax Rulings, APAs and State Aid: Legal Issues”, 
(2015) vol. 24:2, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 119 
 
Kube, Hanno; Reimer, Ekkehart; Spengel, Christoph; “Tax Policy: Trends in the 
Allocation of Powers Between the Union and Its Member States”, (2016) vol. 
25:5-6, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 247 
 
Lang, Michael, “State Aid and Taxation: Recent Trends in the Care Law of the 
ECJ”, (2012), Issue 2, ​European State Aid Law Quarterly​, p. 411 
 
Lovdahl Gormsen, Liza; “EU State Aid Law and Transfer Pricing: A Critical 
Introduction to a New Saga”, (2016) vol 7:6, ​Journal of European Competition Law 
& Practice​, p. 369 
 
Luja, Raymond; “Do State Aid Rules Still Allow European Union Member States to 
Claim Fiscal Sovereignty?”, (2016) vol 25:5-6, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 312 
 
Moriss, Andrew P. and Moberg, Lotta, “Cartelizing Taxes: Understanding the 
OECD’s Campaign against “Harmful Tax Competition”, (2012), Vol. 4:1, ​Columbia 
Journal of Tax Law​, p. 1 
 
Nicolaides, Phedon, “Fiscal Aid in the EC; A Critical Review of Current Practice”, 
65 
 
Åke Häggqvist 
Lund University 
Spring 2017 
(2001), Vol. 24:3, ​World Competition​, p. 319 
 
Nicolaides, Phedon; “Fiscal State Aid in the EU: The Limits of Tax Authority” (2004) 
vol 27:3, ​World Competition​, p. 365 
 
Piantavigna, Paolo; “Tax Abuse and Aggressive Tax Planning in the BEPS Era: 
How EU Law and the OECD are Establishing a Unifying Conceptual Framework in 
International Tax Law, Despite Linguistic Discrepancies”, (2017) vol 9:1, ​World Tax 
Journal​, p. 47 
 
Radaelli, Claudio and Kraemer, Ulrike; “Governance Areas in EU Direct Tax Policy, 
(2008) vol 46:2, ​Journal of Common Market Studies​, p. 315 
 
Redoano, Michela; “Tax Competition among European Countries. Does the EU 
Matter?”, (2014) vol 34, ​European Journal of Political Economy​, p. 353 
 
Rossi-Maccanico, Pierpaolo, “The Gibraltar Judgment and the Point on Selectivity 
in Fiscal Aids”, (2009) Vol. 18:2, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 67 
 
Rossi-Maccianico, Pierpaolo, Fiscal State Aids, Tax Base Erosion and Profit 
Shifting (2015) vol. 24:2, ​EC Tax Review​, p. 63 
 
Schoueri, Luis; “Arm’s Length: Beyond the Guidelines of the OECD”, (Dec 2010) 
Bulletin for International Taxation​, p. 690 
 
Temple Lang, John; “The Gibraltar State Aid and Taxation Judgment- A 
Methodological Revolution?” (2012) issue 4; ​European State Aid Law Quarterly​ p. 
805 
 
Wattel, Peter; Forum: Interaction of State Aid, Free Movement, Policy Competition 
and Abuse Control in Direct Tax Matters (2013) vol: 5:1, ​World Tax Journal​, p. 128 
 
Wattel, Peter; “Stateless Income, State Aid and the (which?) Arm’s Length 
Principle”, (2016) vol 44:11, ​Intertax​, p. 791 
 
Wittendorf, Jens; “The Transactional Ghost of Article 9(1) of the OECD Model”, 
(2009) vol 63:3, ​Bulletin of International Taxation​, p. 107 
 
OECD: 
 
OECD, ​Harmful Tax Competition: An Emerging Global Issue​, OECD Publishing 
(1998) 
 
OECD, ​The OECD’s Project on Harmful Tax Practices: 2006 Update on Progress 
in Member Countries​, OECD Publishing 
 
OECD, ​Addressing Base Erosion and Profit Shifting​, OECD Publishing (2013) 
 
OECD, ​Action Plan on Base Erosion and Profit Shifting​, OECD Publishing (2013) 
 
OECD, ​OECD Transfer Pricing Guidelines for Multinational Enterprises and Tax 
Administrations​, OECD Publishing (2015) 
 
OECD, ​Aligning Transfer Pricing Outcomes with Value Creation, Actions 8-10: 
Final Reports​, (2015) OECD Publishing 
66 
 
Åke Häggqvist 
Lund University 
Spring 2017 
 
EU Official Publications: 
 
Conclusions of the Council of Economics and Finance Ministers (ECOFIN) of 1 
December 1997 Concerning Taxation Policy, 98/c 2/01 
 
Commission Notice (98/C 384/03) on the Application of the State Aid Rules to 
Measures Relating to Direct Business Taxation (1998) 
 
Code of Conduct Group (Business Taxation) Report to the ECOFIN Council on 29 
November 1999, SN 4901/99 
 
European Commission Staff Working Paper, ​The Internal 
Market : Factual Examples of Double Non-Taxation​, Consultation Document (2012) 
 
COM(2015) 302, ​Communication from the Commission to the European Parliament 
and the Council: A Fair and Efficient Corporate Tax System in the European Union: 
5 Key Areas for Action​ (2015) 
 
Commission Notice (2016/C 262/01) on the Notion of State Aid as Referred to in 
Article 107(1) of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union (2016) 
 
Commission working paper on state aid and tax rulings (2016) 
 
Press Releases: 
 
European Commission press Release of 11 July 2001: "Commission launches 
large scale state aid investigation into business taxation schemes", Retrieved 
2017-05-03: ​http://europa.eu/rapid/press-release_IP-01-982_en.htm 
 
Web Resources: 
 
the Official Website of the European Commission, Retrieved 2017-05-03: 
http://ec.europa.eu/taxation_customs/business/company-tax/harmful-tax-competitio
n_en#code_conduct 
 
the OECD’s Official Website, retrieved 2017-05-01: 
http://www.oecd.org/tax/aggressive/ 
 
 
  
67 
 
Åke Häggqvist 
Lund University 
Spring 2017 
Table of Cases 
 
Court of Justice of the European Union: 
 
C-70/72, ​Commission v. Germany ​(1973) 
C-173/73, ​Italy v. Commission​ (1974) 
C-248/84, ​Germany v. Commission​ (1987) 
C-41/90, ​Höfner and Elser v. Macroton ​(1991) ECR I-1979 
Joined cases C-72/91 and C.73/91, ​Firma Sloman Neptun v. Seebetriesrat Bodo 
Ziesemer der Sloman Neptun Schiffarts ​(1993) ECR I-00887 
C-279/93, ​Finanzamt Köln-Altstadt v. Roland Schumacker​ (1995) ECR I-00225 
C-39/94, ​SFEI and Others v. La Poste and Others​ (1996) ECR I-03547 
C-353/95 P ​Tiercé Ladbroke v. Commission ​(1997) ECR I-07007 
C-35/96, ​Italy v. Commission​ (1998) ECR I-3851 
C-342/96, ​Spain v. Commission​ (1999) ECR I-02459 
Case C-75/97, ​Belgium v. Commission​ (1999) ECR I-03671 
Joined Cases C-180-184/98, ​Pavlov and Others v. Stichting Pensionsfonds 
Medische Specialisten​ (2000) ECR I-6451 
C-379/98 ​PreussenElektra v. Schleswag ​(2001) ECR I-02099 
C-143/99, ​Adria-Wien Pipeline and Wietersdorfer & Peggauer Zement-werke 
(2001) ECR I-8365 
C-53/00 ​Ferring v. ACOSS​ (2001) ECR I-09067 
C-308/01, ​GIL Insurance and Others v. the Commissioners of Customs and Excise 
(2004) ECR I-04777 
C-222/04, ​Ministero dell’Economia e delle Finanze v. Cassa di Risparmio di 
Firenze and Others​ (2006) ECR I-00289 
C-205/03 P, ​FENIN v. Commission ​(2006) ECR I-6295 
Joined Cases C-182/03 and C-217/03 ​Belgium and Forum 187 v. Commission 
(2006) ECR I-05479 
C-49/07, ​MOTOE v. Elliniko Dimosio​ (2008) ECR I-04863 
C-487/06, ​British Aggregates v. Commission ​(2008) ECR I-10515 
C-169/08, ​Presidente del Consiglio dei Ministri v. Regione Sardegna ​(2009) ECR 
I-10821 
C-555/07, ​Kücükdeveci v. Swedex​ (2010) ECR I-00365 
C-78-80/08, ​Ministero dell’Economica e delle Finanze and Agenzia delle Entrate v. 
Paint Graphos​ (2011) ECR I-07611 
Joined Cases C-106-107/09 P, ​Commission and Spain v. Gibraltar and UK​ (2011) 
ECR I-11113 
C-279/08 P, ​Netherlands v. Commission ​(2011) ECR I-07671 
C-6/12, ​P Oy ​(2013) 
C-66/14, ​Finanzamt Linz v. Bundesfinanzgericht​ (2015) 
Joined cases C-20/15 P and C-21/15 P, ​Commission v. Banco Santander, Santusa 
Holding and World Duty Free Group​ (2016) 
 
Opinions: 
 
Opinion of Advocate General Darmon in Case C-72/91 
Opinion of Advocate General La Pergola in Case C-75/97 
Opinion of Advocate General Geelhoed in case C-308/01 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in case C-169/08 
Opinion of Advocate General Jääskinen in joined cases C-106-107/09 
Opinion of Advocate General Kokott in case C-66/14 
68 
 
Åke Häggqvist 
Lund University 
Spring 2017 
Court of First Instance/General Court: 
 
T-358/94, ​Air France v Commission​ (1996) ECR II-02109 
Joint Cases T-92/00 and T-103/00, ​Territorio Histórico Álava and Others v. 
Commission​ (2002) ECR II-01385 
Joined cases T-211/04 and T-215/04, ​Commission and Spain v Government of 
Gibraltar and the United Kingdom​ (2008) ECR II-03745 
T-500/12, ​Ryanair v. Commission ​(2015) 
T-473/12, ​Aer Lingus v Commission ​(2015) 
T-219/10 ​Autogrill España v. Commission ​(2014) 
T-399/11, ​Banco Santander and Santusa Holding v. Commission​ (2014) 
 
WTO: 
 
WTO Dispute Settlement (DS) 108 Appellate Body Report circulated on January14 
2002 
 
Commission Decisions: 
 
Preliminary Decision SA.38944 ​Amazon​ (2014) O.J. C/44/2015 
Commission Decision SA.38375​ ​Fiat​ (2015) O.J. L/351/2016 
Commission Decision SA.38374 ​Starbucks ​(2015) O.J. L/83/2017 
Commission Decision SA.37667 ​Excess Profit​ (2016) O.J. L/260/2016 
Commission Decision SA.38373 ​Apple ​(30.08.2016) 
 
 
 
 
69 
 
